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PREFACE
The simultaneous permanence of an institution through
out centuries and its permeance throughout the society of a
continent is certainly a unique political phenomenon. The
Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has accomplished this,
without question,
. due in no small part to the religious fer-
vor transplanted and nurtured by the Mother country. Yet,
the institutional Church is also a political entity, which
in Latin America has been immersed in a turbulent political
arena and has demonstrated a remarkable ability, nevertheless,
to sustain itself. The mechanism for the propagation of the
Church as a vital political force in Latin America is the
subject of this dissertation.
In Chapter I
,
we begin by considering the various
frameworks which have been developed by social and political
scientists and religious observers for viewing the Catholic
Church. These approaches are valuable in that each reveals
some aspect of the Church's political posture vis-a-vis Latin
American society. Yet these very approaches are limited be-
cause they fail to provide a general framework in which one
can understand the evolution of the Church as a political
institution. It is proposed that such a general framework
can be found in the dynamic theme of adaptation of the politi-
cal Church to the social, economic and political exigencies
in Latin America.
v
The various frameworks outlined in Chapter I are
applied in the following two chapters in the form of case
studies. We have chosen two countries, Colombia and Chile,
where the Catholic Church is examined in an historical con-
text. These two countries differ significantly with regard
to their respective Church histories, the relationship of
other internal institutions and forces to each Church, and
to their experiences in the dynamic world of the twentieth
century.
The concluding chapter is a brief summary and a com-
parative discussion of these two Churches. It is an attempt
to view comprehensively the Colombian and Chilean Churches
through the perspective of adaptation. Rather than make any
broad statements concerning what lies ahead for the Catholic
Church in Latin America, we suggest why this institution is
unique. In this explanation is embedded the essential ele-
ments that will determine the future evolution of the Catholic
Church in Latin American society.
vi
1CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA
Latin American society from the 16th century to the
20th had been supported politically and philosophically by
three institutions—the army, the landowners, and the clergy.
They had gathered .their cohesiveness, their influence, their
money and their vitality to shape and direct the destiny of
this Spanish colony. Over the span of four centuries, these
three so-called "pillars of society" not only guided Latin
American communities, but coalesced "to ensure their very own
institutional survival and well-being." 1 We might say that
m this sense they exhibited political action. Philosophical-
ly, they acted as the purveyors of social mores and religious
beliefs for the Latin American masses. The institution that
reflected both of these political and philosophical dimensions
was the clergy.
When we speak of the clergy in Latin America, we are
effectively referring to the Roman Catholic Church. To cor-
rect any misunderstandings of the term "Church," let us de-
fine it as the hierarchical structure of that institution
(i.e.
,
cardinals, bishops and other clergy)
. With regard to
Ivan Vallier's notion of elites, let us include in this
1 Robert Adie and Guy Poitras, Latin America : The
Politics of Immobility, New Jersey: Pr entice-Hall, Inc
. ,
1974, p. 1T6.'
2definition those laymen who have exerted an influence on the
Catholic system in Latin America. 2
Obviously, "nominal" Catholics have not been taken
into account here. Though 90% of Latin Americans today have
been baptized in the Catholic faith, and a large proportion
of Catholics throughout the world are Latins, too few in Latin
America are practicing Catholics. (".
. . two-thirds of the
Catholics there never take first communion and most rarely if
ever attend Church.") 3
Until the independence movements of the early 1800's,
the place of the Church in Latin American society as a poli-
tical and as a philosophical or religious institution was
firmly secured. However, since the loss of Spanish patronage
and attempts by newly independent states to limit Church
authority to the religious sphere, "there has been a partial,
but continuous liquidation of the political past." 4 Along-
side this political upheavel, the Church continued to direct
the religious and philosophical beliefs of the people.
2 Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites: Differentiations
and Developments in Roman Catholicism," in Elites in Latin
America, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, London
Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 190.
3 Adie and Poitras, p. 154.
4 Francois Houtart and Emile Pin, The Church and The
Latin American Revolution, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965,
p. 33
.
3This particular but general assessment of the Roman
Catholic Church up to the early 1900
-s has found common agree-
ment among political analysts. A reflection of this consensus
can be found in the frequent references to Lloyd Mecham's
work on Church-State relations for this period. 5
However
,
with the arrival of the 20th century, and
the waning of the political authority of the Church, we can
note the first tremors in the pillars of that institution as
a religious body. With the growing emphasis on technology, the
introduction of different ideologies, the emergence of new
interest groups, the flight of the masses to urban centers,
and developments in communication networks and mass media,
traditional Latin American society has been shaken to its
very core. 6
Many of these sociological trends have posed a chal-
lenge to the Roman Catholic Church. For example, the intro-
duction of new ideologies and religions into Latin America
(e.g., Marxism and Protestantism), has brought into question
various aspects of the Church's relationship to the masses.
As a result of the population shift, the Church hierarchy has
begun to examine who it is teaching.
. . and with the concur-
rent shift toward more relaxed and permissive behavior, what
b Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America,
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966.
6 Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites," p. 194.
4it is teaching. The Church has felt it necessary to incor-
porate many of the technological advances, such as the mass
media, into its format for disseminating information to the
masses
.
The Church's reading of these new trends and its sub-
sequent responses, highlights the interrelation of the reli-
gious and political dimensions of that institution. For
example, with the emergence of marginal interest groups into
the apex of the political arena, the hierarchy has had to
review its political alignments. With the recent shifts in
the makeup of the clerical hierarchy, the Church is subse-
quently shifting its political leanings.
In short, the Church, like Latin American society,
is in a state of flux. We can note this sense of change and
ferment in the varied interpretations of political and reli-
gious analysts concerning the status of the Church in Latin
America today. By no means do we find the consensus that
existed among analysts with regard to the pre-20th century
Catholic Church. Not only is there debate over who or what
is most threatening to the authority of the Church, but dis-
putes have arisen over how well the institution is responding.
The Roman Catholic Church today is being viewed
through a variety of perspectives. The political nature of
the institution seems to take on a different face, depending
on the approach of the viewer or analyst. In an attempt to
understand the political posture of the Church, we will survey
5a number of the more prominent perspectives,
will try to present a unifying theme that wi
lS
- In the end, we
ll reconcile the
many faces with the one institution.
An examination of the Catholic Church and subsequent
conclusions as to where it is headed, its impact on society,
its status compared to other authoritative institutions, etc.
are contingent upon the approach or point of reference one
takes in the initial study. We can identify six variables
or aspects which a number of analysts have used when contem-
plating the Church in Latin America. These variables take
into account many of the singular approaches found in the
literature
.
A succinct summary and critical analysis of these
approaches will be presented in the following pages. The
various aspects include: the Church-State approach, Papal-
Church relations, the Church's hierarchical structure, new
trends in Latin America, the Church's response, and Church
adaptation. These aspects are not meant to be mutually ex-
clusive, but rather complementary views of the political
role of the Church in Latin America. Consequently, some of
the prominent authors have made significant contributions in
a number of the aspects which we will consider. These authors
will be explicitly mentioned at the beginning of each section.
The individual works are cited as they appear in the text.
6The Church-State Approach
The Church-State approach, from an historical perspec-
tive, is a most appropriate place to begin our study. This
aspect provides us with some sense of the Catholic Church
through time, as well as its place in Latin American history.
Needless to say, this aspect allows us, at the start, to con-
ceptualize an overall picture of the Roman Catholic Church
in Latin America, In this analysis we will draw heavily upon
the works of Robert Adie and Guy Poitras, Francois Houtart
and Emile Pin, and Lloyd Mecham.
The Spanish Crown, just beginning to colonize Latin
America at the close of the 15th century, was awarded the
right of patronato by the Pope, a right that was conceded in
various stages by various Popes. 7 By the end of the reign
of Philip II, civil authorities were extending significant
control over the Church, 8 for the Spanish Crown had been
given the right to collect tythes, to establish new missions,
and had asserted control over the entrance into Latin America
of papal documents and decrees. 9
Royal aid and supervision proved benefical to the
religious institution in Latin America. The Church, as a
Mecham, pp. 13-20.
8 Ibid.
,
p. 20.
9 Ibid
. ,
p. 3 6.
7civilizing agent of the state, became the educator and healer
of the Latin American masses, through its schools, hospitals
and charitable institutions. Particularly, in the absence
of other religious organizations, the Church "had impressed
itself upon the minds of the people and had convinced them that
only by its ministrations was it possible to secure the
blessings of eternal salvation." 15 By advancing the economic
interests of the state, the Church acquired some of the best
lands in the region, 11
These assets gave the Church entrance into the elite
core of power holders in Latin America during the pre-inde-
pendence period. The clergy shared the pedestal of power with
the conquistadores
, capitalists, and colonial administrators. 12
However, this so-called "alliance of the sword and the cross" 13
amounted in the end to an unbalanced partnership. For as
long as secular forces controlled Church financing 14 and
were involved in Church support, the autonomy of the clergy
was severely limited. 15 Such political accommodations were
to be severely tested in the early 1800's when dissatisfaction
with Spanish control exploded.
1
u
Ibid
. ,
p. 43 .
1
x
Adie and Poitras, p. 151.
1
2
Houtart and Pin, p. 7.
1
J
Adie and Poitras, p. 151.
1
4
Mecham, p. 40.
1
5
Luigi Einaudi, Richard Maulin, Alfred Stepan, and
Michael Fleet, Latin American Institutional Development: The
Changing Catholic Church, The Rand Corporation, 1969
,
p. 74.
8During the independence period, the Church was drawn
completely into the revolutionary struggle. As a m€raber of
the traditional oligarchy, dominant forces of the Church
aligned with the conservatives, loyal to Spain. However, a
telling number in the lower clergy fought in support of the
Revolution. (Prom a class point of view, many in the top
rung of the clergical hierarchy and loyal to the Crown were
Spanish born. Correspondingly, a good number acting on the
side of the independistas were born in the American contin-
ent
.) 16 in addition, those clerics who took part in the
independence struggle often did so for reasons other than
religious
.
1
7
While there was some division within the ranks of
the clergy, the Latin American masses remained loyal to the
Church throughout this traumatic period. Virtually no oppo-
sition was voiced concerning the Church as a religious insti-
tution. 1 8
With the assertion of independence from Spain, leaders
of the independence movement sought to deprive the Church of
those means and privileges which enabled it to exercise poli-
tical power ." 19 (Many lower clergy aligned themselves with the
Kcirl Schmitt, ed
. ,
The Roman Catholic Church in Modern
Latin America
,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, p. 4.
1 7 Mecham, p. 42.
1 8 ibid
.
,
p. 60.
1 9 Ibid.
,
p. 417 .
9independistas with this intent.
)
Not only was the political
dimension of the Church threatened, but there was considerable
opposition to its immense wealth and to its influence in non-
religious concerns ( e .g
. ,
its control over education).
The growing trend to curb the political, secular and
financial powers of the Church culminated in profound changes
in its political and legal status. 20 The first attempt to
restrict the Church to the religious sector was realized in
Colombia in 18 53 . From that point in time on, the anticleri-
cal movement permeated throughout Latin America, with rather
uneven results. Catholic Churches in Colombia, Argentina and
Venezuela, for example, were established as the religion of
the state. In other countries, like Brazil, Chile, and Guate-
mala, the Church became independent from the governing bodies.
In some cases, the Church was placed under the rigid control
of the state, as in Mexico. 21
By the beginning of the 20th century, the disestablish-
ment of the Church and State had taken place in most Latin
American countries. Up to and including this time, we can
note some general trends. Throughout the 19th century, the
Church continued to monopolize the religious sphere. However,
its political activity and influence had becone limited,
particularly in light of its "loss of land, wealth, monopoly
2 0 Ibid
.
,
p. 60.
21 Adie and Poitras, p. 153.
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over education, censorship over literature and press, control
over hospitals, over public charities, over universities,
over marriage, registration of birth, over burial grounds,
and over the right to exclude other faiths from the coun-
try." 22 Finally, yet of primary importance, the Church re-
mained, for the most part, a traditional/oligarchic institu-
tion, working with and for conservative forces in Latin
America, often to preserve its remaining political and secu-
lar interests.
It becomes inaccurate to speak of the Church in Latin
America from an historical, Church-State perspective after
the early 1900's. With the uneven disentanglement of Church-
State relations, we no longer have a monolithic Church. Not
only did the anticlerical movement culminate in different
rates and various methods of separation within each country,
but each state and its respective Church experienced internal
and external pressures which had singular and varying effects
on each Church. In addition, since it is contemporaneous to
our epoch, it becomes difficult to get an accurate historical
perspective.
2 2 Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America
,
New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964, p. 62.
11
Papal-Church Relations
Though the Church in each country has responded to
internal and external pressures in a variety of ways, we can
indentify certain commonalities among those pressures. This
now becomes a convenient stepping-stone to the initiation of
an altogether different perspective; the remaining aspects
are from the viewpoint of pressures exerted upon the Church,
whether they be of an internal or external nature. The next
phase of this study will deal with the relationship between
the Papacy in Rome and the Catholic Church in Latin America.
This interrelationship has been studied by a number of authors,
most notably, Guenter Lewy, Karl Schmitt, and Ivan Vallier.
Through bulls, briefs, and other documents, the Pope
in Rome has played a significant role in providing direction
for the Catholic Church in Latin America. The Papacy, parti-
cularly since the latter part of the 19th century, has been
influential in steering the Church away from its conserva-
tive political tendencies and towards more religious and
spiritual involvement.
The Church in Latin America traditionally has been
guided by a higher authority, if not the Pope, then a surro-
gate. When the Pope gave the Spanish Crown the right of
patronage in Latin America early in the 16th century, he
effectively relinquished much of his influence over the
Church. We can see how the Church, under the control of the
12
Spanish Crown, was more concerned with its political relations
than with its missionary role. (Some observers, in fact,
assert that the Church failed to instill a moral/religious/
spiritual feeling in the Latin American masses, 23 simply be-
cause the Church was so embroiled in the political atmosphere
of the colonial period.)
With the outbreak of the independence movements in
the early 1800’s, relations between the Church in Latin America
and the Spanish Crown became confused. "Due to the breakdown
of Spanish authority and the alarming decline of the Catholic
hierarchy in America," 24 a deterioration in the communica-
tions between the Church in Latin American and Rome occurred.
Early on, the Papacy refused to listen to Latin Amer-
ican separatists demands for the transference of the right
of patronage from Spain to the newly independent states. In
the same vein, the Papacy refused to grant political recogni-
tion. However, with the practical achievement of national
independence among the Latin American states, 25 the Pope
apparently accepted a neutral attitude toward the new govern-
ments in Latin America. By 1831,. the Papacy had recognized
the independence of most countries. 25 But to the present day,
23 Adie and Poitras, p. 155. Vallier, "Religious
Elites," pp. 192 - 197.
24Mecham, p. 61.
2 5 Ibid
.
,
p. 64
.
Ibid.
,
p. 85.
13
the Papacy has maintained the right of patronage, never
yielding to the notion that patronage is an inherent right
of sovereignty.
During this period, to the end of the 1800's, the
Church was in marked disarray, particularly in light of the
discrepancy concerning the legitimate authority over the
Church. Confusion also reigned, since many in the hierarchy
remained loyal to Spain, even though the Pope had recognized
newly liberated governments;. But it wasn't until the 1890 's
that we see the Papacy embrace the Church in Latin America
and attempt to direct it towards more formulated goals, more
consistent with its religious ideals.
In 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued his Rerum Novarum.
This encyclical was significant because if focused on the
situation of the urban poor. 27 "It was designed as part of
a more comprehensive program to enable the Church to deal
with the major economic and social problems of the day." 28
Rerum Novarum to a large extent, was politically moti-
vated. It was an attempt to preserve the loyalty of blue
collar/city workers and thwart advances by Marxism in Latin
America. (The effect that Rerum Novarum had on holding off
Marxism is yet another question. But it certainly had an ef-
fect on the direction of the Church.
)
27 Schmitt, p. 4.
2
8
Guenter Lewy, Relig ion and Revolution , New York:
Oxford University Press, 197^
,
p. 527.
14
We can detect,, upon the issuance of this encyclical,
"a turning inward” and a "reevaluation of the Church's posi-
tion m society. 1,29 Prior to this time, the Church was poli-
tically active, mostly to preserve its status and position
in the traditional power structure. After Rerum Novarum,
a form of ghetto Catholicism developed.
. . the Church
divorced itself from national, political, economic and social
life.
"
3 0
We can also note that this encyclical initiated an
emphasis on the religious nature of the Church, but it is
debatable it if caused a change in its political relations.
In time, after other encyclicals were issued along the same
lines, we can note a significant deterioration of the poli-
tical strength and power of the Church. This suggests that
action taken to fulfill new social and religious ideals might
has sapped the strength of the Church in its political rela-
tions .
Various organizations and movements arose in Latin
America in the early 1900's to implement the philosophy of
Rerum Novarum. Most vigorous support was exhibited by Churches
in Chile, Mexico and Brazil. 31 These efforts to develop pro-
grams in support of Papal directives were structure around the
29 Schmitt, p. 4.
3 0 Ibid
.
3 1 Ibid
. ,
p. 16
.
15
Church s paternalistic, traditional framework which had
solidified in the 1800's.
Such clerically-directed paternalistically-organized
programs began to give way to independent action, sponsored
by social organizations having Catholic support. So-called
"Catholic Action" was given momentum by "Quadragesimo Anno,"
an encyclical issued in 1931 by Pope Pius XI, forty years
after Rerum Novarum.
In this encyclical, Pope Pius XI called for an exten-
sion of Christian principles to all of Latin American society.
In so doing, he was asking that Churches deny their support
to communist regimes and movements.
Though the political power of the Church continued
on its down-hill course, the higher clergy, for the most part,
remained conservative. The prohibition against Communism
gave them the incentive to support local dictators. It is
for this reason, and others, that the Church continued to be
labelled as a conservative element, part of the traditional
power structure of Latin America. (To be sure, there were
sprinklings of progressive Churches, movements and organiza-
tions throughout Latin America.)
"In an attempt to bring the Church more up to date,
Pope John XXIII, in the early 1960's shifted away from a
defensive approach to the outside world, seeking to modify
16
institutional rigidity and anachronistic liturgy." 32 He
sought these objectives via papal appointments, encyclicals
and the concerns of Vatican II. Latin America and other less
developed regions were very much in mind when the Papacy called
for a variety of sweeping changes.
The Pope and Vatican II laid the foundations for a
more open attitude to the full spectrum of political philoso-
phies and forms of governments. Pope John reaffirmed the
Papacy's long-standing benevolent attitude toward popular
forms of government, but he went one step further. His empha-
sis on "the social use of private property and on legitimacy
of some forms of public ownership, seemed to move Rome toward
neutrality in the ideological cold war between capitalist
individuali sm and socialist collect iv ism " ^ ^
The concerns of Pope John XXIII and Vatican II had an
enormous effect on Latin American Churches, which were often
caught up in political conflicts bewteen rightist and leftist
forces. This new direction advanced by the Pope has helped
to breakdown long-standing trends toward conservativism and
the ideological isolation of many Latin American Churches.
Pope Paul VI, from the mid 1960's to the present, has
continued to issue encyclicals along the same lines as his
3
2
Einaudi et al., p. 36.
3 3 Ibid
. ,
p. 37.
17
predecessor. In his Popularum Progressio of 1967, he identi-
fied Latin America as part of the Third World. This was sig-
nif icant because it implied the need for change and has helped
to create a climate for action and innovation in Latin Ameri-
ca.
Obviously, the encyclicals and attitudes of Pope John
and Pope Paul have been significant in the political evolu-
tion of the Church. Both have emphasized the need for a more
effective hierarchical structure which would facilitate the
implementation of programs and organizations sponsored by the
Church. However, the political thrust of these events is
still in the process of being felt in Latin America. It is
unclear at the present time if and when these aspirations will
be realized.
The prominent theme which weaves through this particu-
lar study of Papal-Church relations is the influence which
the Papacy is attempting to exert upon the Church. It is very
difficult, if not impossible, to determine a causal relation-
ship between Papal activities and Church response. However,
we have been able to discern certain trends marked by Papal
initiatives
.
The Church has been susceptible to other forces which
urge it down roads, at times contradictory, to Papal direc-
tives. The next perspective, or way of looking at the Church,
identifies pressures coming from within the Latin American
hierarchical structure.
18
Hierarchical Structure
The Catholic Church in Latin America has been be-
sieged by internal pressures and tensions, generally due to
this structural fragmentation. The Church has experienced
this problem since its arrival on the Latin American contin-
ent centuries ago. Most political observers feel that struc-
tural fragmentation detracts from the effectiveness of Church
action. However, there are some who assert that this pheno-
menon is a blessing in disguise. It is from this perspec-
tive, of structural fragmentation, diversity and division,
that we will initiate the next phase of this study. The
fragmentation of the hierarchical structure has been of con-
cern to such prominent authors as Luigi Einaudi, Richard
Alfred Stepan, Michael Fleet, David Mutchler and
Frederick Turner.
The stereotype of an integrated, monolithic Church
is too simple and, in fact, a false image. Traditionally,
the Church has been decentralized and regionally uncoordinated,
a conglomerate of isolated ecclesiastical units. 34 "The
alleged monolith of the Catholic Church contains an extra-
ordinarily diverse and contradictory array of viewpoints on
3 4 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control, and
Modernization in Latin America
,
New Jersey : Prentice-Hall
,
Inc
. ,
1970
,
p. 24
.
19
social and political questions." 35 The diversity and dis-
array within the Church, in its structure and among its per-
sonnel, has been recently highlighted, as the Church has
attempted to tighten its hierarchical structure and to
organize, in order to implement the proposed reforms of
Vatican II.
Fragmentation within the Church is due in part to
conflicts and tensions among the clergy. m the past, the
clergy consisted almost exclusively of individuals from the
upper classes. This provided unity to the clergy. However,
members of the middle class have gradually been entering
their inner sanctum and they have brought with them many Q f
the criticisms and more liberal views expressed by the lower
classes.
Another cause of tension among the clergy is the ap-
parent generation gap. Many of those in the higher echelons
of the clerical rung are quite old. For example, cardinals
in the Latin Church average over 73 years of age, 36 while
those positioned at the lower levels are quite young. It is
important to note here that actual age discrepancies are not
nearly as overwhelming a problem as are the discrepancies
in ideas and philosophies.
3 Frederick Turner, Catholicism and Political Develop-
ment in Latin America
,
Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1971, p. 333.
3
6
Adie and Poitras, p. 163.
20
A more pressing problem for the Church today is the
increasing depletion of its priestly ranks. This has created
a situation where in 1960, the average parish in Latin Amer-
ica consisted of 15,332 Catholics and approximately 1 priest
per 5500. 3
7
This last figure is one-tenth that of a similar
ratio in the United States.
This alarming scarcity of personnel has led to some
other , equally problematical, situations. The Church has been
losing touch with the people, and they in turn, are becoming
disenchanted with Catholicism. Perhaps a more accurate
statement would be that Roman Catholicism is no more than a
tradition for many of the people; that ritual and observance
are a thing of the past. 38 What this means, essentially for
the Church, is that it is gradually losing its grass-roots
ideological support, leading to a confused response by the
Church and a more critical appraisal of the Church by the
masses
.
The decline in the number of clerical personnel has
forced the Latin American Church to import priests from other
regions. Today, one “third of all priests in Latin America
are foreigner s , 3 9 coming from such culturally diverse regions
37 Houtart and Pin, p. 150.
38 Mecham, p. 422.
3
9
Adie and Poitras, p. 161.
21
as North America and Europe. Many foreign priests have been
accused by indigenous clergy, of attempting to impose their
cultures, life styles, and philosophies on the Latin masses. 40
Needless to say, this gives rise to tensions within the cleri-
cal hierarchy and has added to the conflicts among and within
the parishes.
Another phenomenon that has added to these internal
tensions, ironically, is Vatican II. The council "provided
a certain legitimacy for persons and groups who had previ-
ously dissented from anti-Communist political orthodoxy, and
in many cases also opened Church structure to increased in-
ternal democratization." 41 However, an institution that has
been characterized by its authoritarian, oligarchical struc-
ture and has relied, in the past, on papal or state direction,
is going to have a difficult time adjusting to the freedoms
of democracy. In addition, internal debate over the imple-
mentation of Vatican II reforms has tended to polarize the
clergy.
There is no doubt that the Church is experiencing a
decline in its financial resources (even though its finances
are not well documented.) The significance of its financial
40
see Ivan Illich, "The Seamy Side of Charity" in
Schmitt, pp. 152-163.
4 1 Einaudi et al., p. 39.
22
status has some bearing on relationships among the clergy,
some observers of the Catholic Church see this as yet another
cause for conflict in the Church. David Mutchler, a sociolo-
gist, asserts that the depletion of its wealth has created
competition and, at times, conflict among the varied cleri-
cal personnel, due to their frantic search for funds within
and without Latin America. 42
Further fragmentation exists as a result of Church
efforts (after Vatican II) to increase the day-to-day effec
tiveness of Catholicism. 43 To enable it to run as an effi-
cient organization, specialization, along with greater
bureaucratization, has been introduced into the Church. For
example, "religious" priests working with the masses on a
daily basis, find themselves (uncomfortably) working beside
"staff" personnel, assigned to a particular diocese and
trained in secular disciplines. 4
4
Consequently, "the frag-
mentation of practical authority implicit in the structural
complexity of the Roman Catholic Church is compounded by the
presence within each diocess of several types of religious
personnel .
"
4 5
4
2
David Mutchler, The Church as a Political Factor
in Latin America, with particular reference to Co 1ombia and
Chile
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Most observers of the Catholic church „Ln concur with
this rather disheartening appraisal of the Church in Latin
America. However, as was noted earlier, there is some dis-
agreement over the political implications of this situation.
Particularly in terms of effecting social change and having
a hand in the direction of Latin society, many observers
view internal fragmentation as a liability. For example,
the data on the scarcity of personnel raises questions con-
cernang the ability of the Church to penetrate all facets
of Latin society with its spiritual and religious message. 46
Another view is that internal debate of any nature tends to
weaken the already tenuous organizational unity of the Church. 47
An additional analysis asserts that organizational conflict
negates the ability of the religious institution to be effec-
tive on a day-to-day basis
.
4 8 Furthermore
,
any form of internal
dissension dissipates the energy and stifles the potential of
the Church to aid actively and constructively in the develop-
ment of Latin America. 49
On the other hand, some observers see advantages in
further specialization and a more developed Church bureaucracy.
4 6 Ibid
. ,
p
.
19.
4 7 Ibid
. ,
p. 74.
4 8Mutchler
,
p. 5.
4
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Despite some incidental problems, an intensified bureaucracy
allows the Church to maintain its autonomy as a religiously
directly organization. 5 ” Another intriguing line of thought
suggests that "it is most advantageous for the Church to have
a diversity of wings [ideologically speaking], at least one
of which can make an effective rapprochement to whatever
movement takes power at a particular time." 51
In any case, general agreement exists that there is
internal diversity and fragmentation within the hierarchical
structure of the Church. We assert here that this situation
has created a vacuum, allowing other groups and organizations,
religiously and ideologically motivated, to fill in the gaps
and lure away faithful Catholics from the grasp of the
Church. Consequently, not only do we see a Church hemorraging
internally and being pressured by higher Catholic authorities,
but we can discern secular and non-Catholic forces pressuring
the Church in Latin America as well. This leads us into our
next section—an examination of secular and non-Catholic
forces which contribute to the pressures bearing down on the
Catholic Church.
j0Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and Moderniza-
tion in Latin America
,
p. 90.
5 1 Turner, p. 205.
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New Trends in Latin Amer ica
Up to the 20th century, the Catholic Church in Latin
America was universally accepted as the dominant religious
culture. The Latin American masses were educated in one
Philosophy and had established a style of living consistent
with the principles of the Church. The fact that the Church
was able to win and maintain the loyalty of the masses, was
due in no small part to the state's support of that institu-
tion. The Chuch experienced virtually no challenge to its
religious monopoly and was confident in the support of the
Latin American masses during this period.
With the independence movements, the Church, in many
cases, was not awarded the total support of the state, which
it had known in the past. Coupled with this situation, was
the introduction into Latin America of various movements,
professing philosophies which were different and, at times,
contradictory to those of the Church. The challenge which
these movements present to the Church has been explored by
many authors, including Luigi Einaudi, Richard Maulin, Al-
fred Stepan, Michael Fleet, Ivan Vallier and Frederick Turner
Since their introduction, a few of these movements,
have grown and flourished in Latin America. They have en-
croached on the "territory" of the Church to the point where
the Church's religious monopoly has been broken. In
b 2Vallier, "Religious Elites," p. 195.
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fact, their combined success has struck an unprecedented
chord of fear in the Church and has given rise to additional
insecurities, tensions and conflicts within its hierarchy
and in its relations with Latin American society.
In the past fifty years, political movements from the
Left and Protestantism, have increasingly posed a threat to
the Church, challenging its moral authority and continued
institutional existence. 53 All "preach a new reward system,
assume a militant posture against the existing social order,
and articulate a cohesive set of anti-Catholic views." 54
Whereas anti-clerical movements in the 1800's attempted to
remove the Church from the political sphere, these new move-
ments, since World War I, have been challenging the Church
in its remaining cultural, philosophical and religious sphere
of influence
.
5 5
Perhaps more threatening than their arrival onto the
Latin American scene, is their strategy for capturing the
attention and loyalties of the people. Protestantism and
Marxism, for example, are movements which appeal to the lay
person, to the very grass-roots support of the Church. Unfor-
tunately, the Catholic Church is structurally and philosophi-
cally a "vertical" institution, with little emphasis placed
53 Einaudi et al, p. IV.
54Vallier, "Religious Elites," p. 195.
5 5 Ibid.
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on integrating the layman into its organization. The
is ill-equipped to attempt "horizontal solidarity" and
successfully ward off challenges from these movements.
Church
thereby
5 6
In addition, these movements have been causing some tension
within the Church hierarchy. often, controversy has given
way to friction because the clergy have not yet arrived at
a consensus on how to deal with this new and threatening
situation.
Consistent with this theme, we can note some new
sociological trends which pressure the Church as well. The
rising importance of marginal status groups, which previously
had remained outside of the power structure, have been de-
manding and receiving more power as part of the decision-
making system. Here, we are referring to such groups as the
middle class, university students, peasants and farmers. So
today, the Church must consider a wider and more diverse range
of influential groups in structuring its political alignments.
Another sociological trend that is affecting the
Church as well as other movements, in recent years, is the
effort to modernize Latin America, particularly via technolo-
gical advancements. Developments in the area of mass communi-
cations can affect the way in which religious functions are
performed and how policies and doctrines are filtered down
to the grass-roots level. 57 If the Church does not take full
5 6 Ibid
. ,
pp. 19 5-197.
5/ Turner, p. 196.
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advantage of these developments, certainly other movements
Will, in order to more effectively indoctrinate the masses
and capture their attention. So the Church, to ward off fur-
ther advances by Protestantism and secular movements, and to
maintain the loyalty of various interest groups, is being
pressured to reorganize and reorient its religious communi-
ties by taking full advantage of technological developments. 5
It has been claimed that there is a "new rhythm" to
Latin American society today, due in part to secular and anti-
Catholic movements and to more subtle sociological trends
(e.g., the emergence of aggressive interest groups, popula-
tion shifts to urban centers, growth of a vibrant middle class,
and technological advances). 5 ’ This "new rhythm" i n Latin Amer-
ica is challenging the traditional institutions and their
more authoritative and conservative ideologies and modes of
behavior. Today, attention focuses more on the demands and
needs of those at the bottom end of society, rather than on
the desires and whims of the ruling elite.
These new circumstances call for a change in the
policies and hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church.
They also beg for a shift in the conservative political posture
of the Church, which it traditionally has assumed.
5
8
Ibid
.
,
p. 202.
59Vallier, "Religious Elites," p. 194.
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Church Response
The following examination of the clerical response to
the changing Latin American environment represents the fifth
approach to viewing the Catholic Church. This aspect deals
primarily with that minority of clerics and laymen who are
calling for an emerging new Church, one that will shed its
cloak of conservativism. it views their varied efforts to
unite a Church that is in disarray politically and failing on
the religious front. The generation of progressive and radi-
cal ideas from within the hierarchical structure of the Church
in response to new trends in Latin American society has been
studied by Robert Adie, Guy Poitras, Guenter Lewy, and John
Martz amongst others.
To meet the demands of a changing Latin American en-
vironment, some significant developments within the Church have
occurred. Since World War II, the laity have played an in-
creasingly important role, various organizations and activi-
ties have appeared and grown, and a Catholic-inspired party
has entered the political forum.
The more liberal and radical sectors of the laity,
varying of course, from country to country, have become a
real force in opening the Church to more progressive policies
and attitudes. It should be noted, though
,
that "the think-
ing of these individuals is influential in shaping Church
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policies only to the extend that its first affects the views
of ths narrow Church hierarchy " 6 ®
The laity have made their views public through vari-
ous organizations and at various meetings, m much the same
way, certain sectors of the clergy have aired their thoughts
and attitudes. The most familiar example is the Latin Ameri-
can Bishops- Council (CELAM), a regional forum where Latin
clergy express their demands for reform. 61
This organization, founded in 1955, has evolved into
a major network for the dissemination of material focusing
on Church reform, modernization, and social change. 62 However,
CELAM has not quite played the advocacy role originally en-
visioned. 63 In any case, CELAM represents initial efforts by
clerics to unite on a large scale and attempt to direct the
Church.
There are many who find that organizations like CELAM
do not serve their more radical interests. So several clergy
have formed organizations, at times following the lead of
Camilo Torres, the guerilla priest from Colombia. To date,
there are various revolutionary groups in several Latin Amer-
ican countries. However, they have not yet had a formidable
6
u
Turner, p. 47.
61 Adie and Poitras, p. 181,
b2 Schmitt, p. 23,
63 Adie and Poitras, p. 181.
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impact in swaying the policies of the Church. it is note-
worthy that in the past, impatient radical clergy often left
the Church. Today they are remaining within the ranks and
justifying "their radicalism by references to the revolu-
tionary dynamic they see inherent in the Christian message." 6 “
These are but a few of the efforts by clergy and lay-
men to change the direction of the Church and to make it more
responsive to Latin society. Perhaps the organization that
has the greatest potential, according to many political obser-
vers, to act as a cohesive force and directional base for the
Church, is the Christian Democratic Party. 6S it holds this for
the Church because it is able to compete in the political
arena, unlike internal Church and lay organizations.
Christian Democracy is a Cathol ic - inspired movement
which originated in the inter-war period, and came into its
own in the 50'
s
and 60's. ,>(> it surfaced as a viable, national
political party in Chile and Venezuela, securing the Presi-
dency in Chile in the year 1964 and in Venezuela in 1968. The
relation of Christian Democracy to the Catholic Church is
fairly clear. It has been inspired not only by western
r> 4 Lewy
,
Religion and Revolution
, p . 533 .
(l JVallier, Catholicism, Soc ial Control and Moderniza-
tion in Lat in America
, p . 92.
6
b
John Nartz, ed
. ,
The Dynamics of Change in Latin
American Politics
,
2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971, p. 202.
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democracy and socialism, but by the more progressive papal
social encyclicals. In fact, the early Christian Democratic
Parties were basically Catholic lay political movements."
For example, the Falange National, the forerunner of the
Chilean Christian Democratic Party, was established by Cath-
olic laymen in Chile in the late 1930's under the influence
of progressive clergy.
It is important to note that there is no direct tie
with the ecclesiastical structure. 68
"Nevertheless, pro-
gressive clergy are able to support political leaders who, if
electorally successful, will be receptive to the demands of
the progressive clergy and, more than that, will do what
they can to implement the demands through their official
positions in government." 69
The implications of a successful Christian Democratic
Party are enormous for the Church. In the past, direct poli-
tical activity by the Church (which was a necessity in order
to maintain its status and influence) was costly, in the
sense that it sapped the strength and energy that should have
been directed to religious and social concerns. But Christian
Democracy, from the perspective of the Church, serves to ne-
gate the need for direct clerical political involvement, 70
6
7
Schmitt, p. 23.
68 Ibid .
69Adie and Poitras, p. 179.
70 Vallier, "Religious Elites," p. 209.
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In turn, the Church can concentrate on non-secular matters.
In this sense, Christian Democratic Parties act as a buffer
between the Church and the political arena. 71
It has been asserted that in the absence of a strong
Christian Democratic Party, political expression will remain
fragmented. 7
7
It is also claimed that such a party is a
condition for long-term development in Latin America. 75 From
a hypothetical viewpoint, this might be the case. However,
the Christian Democratic Parties, in most countries today,
are invariably fragmented. in Chile, for instance, a schism
has developed between those clergy who are seeking ideologi-
cal purity and those who are practically inclined. 74
There are many clergy who have tremendous hopes for
Christian Democracy and what it can do for Latin America and
for the Church. However, there are those outside of the Church
who would favor the formation of Christian Democratic Parties,
but for precisely the opposite reasons of the clergy. From
this latter viewpoint, to subsume the political energies of
the Church into a political party, effectively removes the
71 Vallier, Catholici sm
,
Social Control and Moderniza-
tion in Latin America
,
p . 9 2 .
'
72 Einaudi et al., p. 59.
7 3 Vallier
,
Catholicism, Social Control jand Moderniza -
tion in Latin America, pi 92 *
7 4Martz
,
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sacrosanct stature of the Church as a critic of society.
While from the viewpoint of the clergy, the Christian Demo-
cratic Parties serve the role of a buffer, from the view-
point of those outside of the Church, the Christian Democra-
tic Parties can serve as a vehicle of co-optation.
These various attempts to unite the Church and to
direct the Church are important precisely because the old
style of politics is removed. Clerics and laymen are trying
to create an effective Church, but one that is above politics.
These are attempts to maintain a powerful, influential Church,
by political maneuver ings from within the Church.
Adaptation
Five; perspectives have been outlined in the previous
pages. Each highlights a different "face" of the Church and
suggests or intimates something about its future as a reli-
gious and political institution in Latin America. To be sure,
there is some controversy over the condition and status of
the Catholic Church, but a hazy picture can be drawn from
these studies, nevertheless.
We can discern an institution that has lost much of
its political clout. It has, for the most part, continued
to be identified as a conservative institution. There is
another face to the Church, a Church that is threatened by
non-Catholic movements and pressured by clerical forces from
within and without the Latin American continent. Finally, we have
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noted recent attempts by clergy and laymen to cope with
this situation.
These varied, seemingly disjointed themes fit into
place and form a clear picture when we examine the Church
from yet another perspective. This should be regarded as
more than another way of looking at the Church, for this ap-
proach has the effect of tying together the other five, as
an all-encompassing theme. It is found, at least implicitly,
to varying extents, throughout the major works on the Church.
It is a theme that explains how and why the Church is able
to survive in a rapidly and vastly changing society. It
also serves to illustrate the Church's response, in many
cases, to the various pressures bearing down upon it.
The Catholic Church is a follower or a responder. 7 5
"It is an example of that type of organization which is over-
whelmingly conservative,
. . . becomes an integral part of
the existing order,
. .
.
(and which knows to attain her end)
by a process of adaptation and compromise." 76 Out of the sheer
will to survive and the need for accommodation, the Church has
proven itself to be a flexible institution and, more recently,
a legitimator of social change.
1 5Vallier, Catholicism
,
Social Contro l and Moderniza
-
tion in Latin Americ a, p. 158.
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This theory of adaptation, as it shall henceforth be
called, is founded in the nature of Church doctrines. They
are sufficiently and purposely flexible and ambiguous, leav-
ing room for interpretation so that the Church can respond to
a variety of situations. 7 ' A good measure of this ambiguity
can be attributed to "highly abstract theological and meta-
physical foundations of Catholic political theory, but much
is a matter of design that serves to pave the way for the
Church's adjustment to different situations." 78
The lack of precision in Catholic social doctrines al-
lows the Church to coexist with a variety of different regimes.79
Pope Leo XIII, in 1890, officially established this principle,
"it is not her province to decide which is the best amongst
many diverse forms of government, and the civil institutions
of Christian states, and amid the various kinds of state rule
she does not disapprove of any, provided the respect due to
religion and the observance of good morals be upheld." 80 His
successors upheld this doctrine. Pope Pius XI in 1933 rein-
forced this notion of Church neutrality. 81 Though there ad-
mittedly has been a trend to support popular regimes, the
Church can still manage under other forms of governments.
7 7 Ibid ,,p t 326,
7 6 Ibid
.
/9 Turner, p. 89
80 Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany,
pp. 327-328
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The Church as an institution, acts on behalf of its
terests and its own survival, it will support a regime
that Win, in turn, protect the welfare of its position in
society and its spiritual mission. This explains, for the
most part, the reason for the Church's political posture in
the past. It has "traditionally been associated with conser-
vative forces because it is a source of power, as well as a
source of personal security and prestige." 82
In addition, the possibility of success is a remark-
ably persuasive force in determining the attitude of the Church
to many political movements, 03 This played a part in the
Church's attitude towards the independence movements of the
early 18 00's. The fact that many of these movements were
grossly anticlerical, further persuaded the Church to cling
to its traditional means of support, the conservative ruling
powers
.
However, there are limitations to the breadth of
Church support for political regimes, "Neutrality of the
Church toward various forms of government derives from the
f^ct that the chief concern of the Church is with the super-
natural aspects of human existence." 84 When governments vio-
late the moral principles of the Judeo-Christ ian tradition
8
^Turner, p. 107,
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and the fundamental rights of the Church, it will withdraw
its support and transfer it to a rebel group, with the assur-
ance that its interests will be protected and that there is
a real possibility that the rebels will prevail. 05
The ability of the Church to adapt is not confined
to its relations with governments. It also enables the Church
to be flexible and to react to the ever-changing social and
political environment in Latin America.
The Church, early on, developed in Latin America, a
strategy of survival, "a maximization of short-run gains when
conditions are favorable, an exercising of restraint in per-
iods of uncertainty, and an ever-ready willingness to be in-
consistent if the situation demands it." 86 Church activites
were confined to short-run maneuverings by coalescing with
power groups. Again, this explains Church allegiance
to conservative forces in power.
The independence movements and anti-clerical ideolo-
gies presented a dilemma to the Church. To support them meant
losing much of its power and base of support. Yet, to remain
loyal to conservative forces meant clinging to a sinking ship.
So to maintain its status and at the same time to insulate
itself from diverse secular influences and rivalries, the
85 Ibid
.
, p. 33 6.
86Vallier, Catholicism, Socia l Contro l and Moderni-
zation in Latin America, p. 25.
87Vallier, "Religious Elites," pp. 192-193.
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church began to build up its own institutions (e.g.
, trade
unions, schools, and youth movements). 08 This period illus-
trates the Church's ability to exhibit restraint in the midst
of an unsettled environment. Emerging from this period,
appeared a Church as diverse as the types of governments and
social attitudes prevailing in Latin America.
It must be noted that the Church is by no means quick
to adapt to a changing environment. It often needs a push by
some outside forces to move it along. Papal encyclicals and
attitudes have served this purpose well. Needless to say,
their thinking, beginning with Pope Leo XIII, has helped move
the Church in this direction. In fact, a major emphasis of
Pope John XXIII' s was to adjust its traditional policies and
actions to contemporary times. 89
In modern times, fear underlies change in the Church.
It is the fear that secular forces, and in particular, anti-
Catholic forces, will diminish the power, status and mass sup-
port of the Church. Protestantism has converted many Catho-
lics since the 1900 's in Latin America. Ironically, Protes-
tantism has flourished because it learned fast, that to suc-
ceed in Latin America, it had to adapt to the Latin environ-
ment. (It has provided welfare to the masses and stressed
8 8Va 11 ier
,
Cathol
i
cism, Soc ial Control and Moderni-
zation in Latin America
,
p. 8,
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egalitarian relationships.,’" m an attempt to offset these
gains, the Church has "increased the number of priests, inten-
sified efforts to encourage vocations, multiplied its dioceses,
and increased its parishes." 91
The Church is also threatened by Marxism and other
anti-Christian movements. An adaptive response, in part, lies
m lts attemPt to increase mass support for the Church by
confronting some of the social and economic problems of the
people. 92 This is a pragmatic response, one of the more out-
standing pervasive shifts in Catholic attitudes. 93 At the
same time, the effort to broaden the base of Church support
is an attempt to consider various groups which were once the
marginal groups of Latin American society.
A central theme in the Church's response to these
situations today is the fact that the Church is gaining inde-
pendence from the State. Church leaders have begun to realize
that Church dominance is no longer maintained on a political
basis with the ruling powers. 94 Good relations with the
90 Richard Newbold Adams, The Second Sowing: Power
and the Secondary Development in Latin Ajnjrica
,
San Francisco
,
Cal.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967, p. 209.
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political group or groups in power are no longer sufficient
to preserve the status, influence and power of the Catholic
Church. Thus the clergy have begun to address themselves to
what is happening on the total Latin American scene.
An integral part of this new attitude and involvement
in Latin American society is the Church's role in the devel-
opment process in Latin America. The Church is not an inno-
vator when it comes to social change, but a reinforcer or
legitimator of patterns of change. This inclination i s a
natural outgrowth of the Church's adaptive tendencies. The
social-political environment is following a certain path and
the Church, as a responsive institution, is following in its
footsteps
.
There are many observers who assert that the vitality
of Latin American society, unable to cope with the complexi-
ties of modernization, is critically deteriorating. If this
is the case, then the Church in adjusting to society, is only
reinforcing its own deterioration. The principle of adapta-
tion which has enabled the Latin American Church to survive
and prosper for the last four centuries
,
ironically, could
lead to the Church's own undoing. As a tool of survival,
the present concept of adaptation may be outmoded, to be re-
placed by a broader view of "adapting" to a future society,
It
• /i . e innovating" in the context of the present society.
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In light of the theoretical discussion of the pre-
vious section. Chapters II and III constitute comparative
studies of Church activities and policies in Colombia and
Chile. It may seem paradoxical that we plan to consider these
two countries, which are so divergent with regard to the
experiences of the Catholic Church. They represent extreme
cases for the following reasons: the Colombian Church is
considered a conservative institution, whereas the Church in
Chile is rated as the most progressive in Latin America;
the Colombian Church is state supported, while the Chilean
Church is legally separated from the State.
We have purposely chosen countries of such extremes
because they provide the best test for the proposed principle
of adaptation
. Certainly, the validity of this principle
is clearer in such extreme cases where the need for adapta-
tion is more pronounced. If we fail to succeed in applying
the theme of adaptation to these two extreme cases, there is
certainly little hope of viewing it in other Latin American
countries
.
In the same spirit of looking at extreme cases in
Latin America, we would also like to look at critical times
within each country. In terms of Colombia and Chile, this
means a greater concentration on certain key political events
that have taken place in the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER II
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COLOMBIA
Colombia has often been considerd the most Catholic
of all Latin American countries. This is due in large part
to the prominent position that the Church has occupied in
Colombian society. The enormous wealth, the overwhelming
influence in education and the legal recognition of the Roman
Catholic Church as the state religion certify the observation
that the Catholic Church has been more tenacious in its hold
upon national and civil life in Colombia than in any other
Latin American country." 1
Not only does the Church have a pervasive hold on
Colombian society, but it has been considered one of the most
conservative Churches in Latin America. "The defense of its
own institutional interests, the nature of its doctrines and
internal organization and, its relationships to its flock" 2
have all led the Church to support traditional values.. Par-
ticularly in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the tendency
for an authoritarian, conservative and/ needless to say,
1 Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America
,
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966,
p. 115.
2 Robert H . D ix
,
Colomb ia_: The Political Dimensions
of Change
,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, p, 311.
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influential Church, was secured by the unusually strong bond
and legally sanctioned interdependence between Church and
State. 3
The Colombian Church is a highly politicized Church,
enmeshed in the mainstream of politics at all societal levels. 4
The role and influence of the Church has been one source of
political division throughout most of Colombian history, par-
ticularly at the level of political party competition. To be
sure, the Church has been so entangled in party politics, that
its partisan involvement, at tames, has tended to negate its
potential conciliatory role and to render ineffective its
spiritual role. 5 One observer has even flatly stated that
the Catholic religion has been rather a source of conflict
and bloody disunity among Colombians." 6
To a large extent. Church dominance and its relation-
ship to the state were determined by the particular party in
3 Luigi Einaudi, Richard Maulin, Alfred Stepan, and
Michael Fleet, Latin American Institutional Development: The
Changing Catholic Church
,
The Rand Corporation, 19 69
,
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power, though this occurred in a more strict sense during the
19th century. More precisely, the position of the Church
paralleled the rise and fall of the Conservative Party. The
Church hierarchy felt threatened by the Liberal Party's ascen-
sion to power and relieved by its downfall, each of which oc-
curred periodically.
Basically, the Conservative-Liberal schism developed
in the mid -18 00's out of competition among the elites of Colom-
bian society for the control of government. m essence, "the
principles invoked on one side were those of religion, morality,
property, and family; and on the other, the counter-values
and counter-norms of liberty, progress, popular sovereignty
and the right of suffrage." 7 Some observers suggest that the
Conservatives used the Cahtolic religion as a means of tapping
mass support. 8 In any case, the bulk of the Church hierarchy,
fast identified its interests with the pro-clerical party. 9
As a consequence of the Church's alignment with the Conserva-
tives, Liberals adopted a posture of extreme anti-clericalism.
This is evident not only in their policies aiming to reduce
the secular influence of the Church, but in the frequent ex-
pulsion of Jesuits from Colombia when they came into power.
7 Ibid
.
,
p. 108.
®Dix
,
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This situation remained constant through the early
1900-s. However
, since that time, various factors have emerged
m Colombia and within the hierarchical institution which have
disrupted the Church's traditional position vis-a-vis the two
parties and Colombian society. Briefly, the effect of modern-
ization, unaccustomed dictatorial rule, the creation of the
National Front, the emergence of the "rebel priest" and the
rise of Protestantism, have each had a significant impact on
the politically conservative, authoritarian posture of the
Catholic Church. For example, with the establishment of the
National Front, political power was dispersed among the com-
peting factions, though a ruling elite still remained. This
situation allowed the Church to withdraw not only from the
political arena, but also from the partisan position it had
occupied in the past. On a more localized level, the Church
has had to contend with the "rebel priest," who has directly
challenged the authority and sanctity of the Roman Catholic
Church before the eyes of the Colombian masses. So within the
past forty years, the Colombian Church has undergone enormous
changes in response to the changing environment and is con-
sidered by many to be in the midst of a reforming period.
These brief remarks have been intended to serve as an
overview of the Colombian Church. The next phase of this case
study will be directed toward a closer examination of the
Catholic Church from an historical point of view, with the
various "faces" of the Church in mind. A concluding section
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will follow, coordinating these "faces" with the all-encom-
passing theme of adaptation.
Church History
Independence from Spain had a minimal effect on the
status of the Church in Colombia. Though it was somewhat
"weakened by the loss of protection of the Spanish Crown, by
uncertainties of republican life and the spirit of liberal-
ism," 10 the Catholic Church easily maintained its privileged
position. Church influence was due in no small part to its
large landholdings and its control of the Colombian educa-
tional system. In addition, in the early years of independence,
many clergy held congressional seats and high administrative
offices
.
From independence to the mid 1840's, the Church united
with the military and landowners, forming a triumvirate of
power-holders. In the Colombian Constitution of 1832, Roman
Catholicism was declared the state religion, barring the pub-
lic worship of any other faith. Also indicative of govern-
mental guardianship was the return of the Jesuits, who had
been expelled in 17 67 . Due in part to Papal appreciation for
the intimate Church-State relations, Colombia was the first
state in Latin American recognized by the Pope as being inde-
pendent from Spain.
1 o Ibid
. ,
p. 306
.
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These actions by the State and the Pope are signifi-
cant because they mark the beginning of certain trends evi-
dent throughout the history of the Catholic Church in Colom-
bia. The recognition of Colombian independence by the Pope
signalled close Papal-Church relations for the future, cli-
maxing in the Concordat of 1886. The recognition of Roman
Catholicism as the state religion, as declared by the Colom-
bian Constitution, marked the integral relationship between
Church and State. The welcome extended to the Jesuits was a
reflection of the partisan political stance adopted by the
Church, for when the Liberals were in power, the Jesuits were
quickly expelled from the country. Finally, this period de-
picts the Church's apparent desire to be protected by those
in power. One observer wryly explains its reluctance to
separate itself from the state as the Church's willingness
to take its chances on being controlled by the government
in return for the chance of being able to control the govern-
ment. " 1 1
The first period of Liberal rule, from approximately
1845 to 1857, was highlighted by a series of severe laws at-
tacking the traditional bases of Church control, in an attempt
to reduce the dominant position of the Church in the economic,
social, and political spheres of Colombian society. Marriage
was made an obligatory civil ceremony and divorce was legalized
1
!
Pat Holt, Colombia Today-And Tomorrow, New York:
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964, p, 117.”
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(both marriage and divorce had been in the sacred realm of
the Church)
,
the ecclesiastical privilege of separate cdurts
was abolished, the Jesuits were expelled, town councils and
parish residents were given the legal privilege of electing
their own priests, the state assumed the education of Catho-
lic priests, etc. The most striking blow was wielded by the
Liberal Congress in 1853, when the first act of separation
of Church and State in Latin America was passed. Ironically,
for the Church, this act brought about near servitude to,
rather than freedom from, the State. 12
These direct attacks on the Church provoked sharp
reactions from some of the more conservative clergy. A
"Catholic Manifesto" was circulated around the state delin-
eating the "foul deeds" of those in power. An archbishop
was even exiled for his keen opposition to these acts.
Conservatives then regained governmental control for
a few very short years. Many of the laws previously passed
by the Liberals were reversed or tempered. For example,
Jesuits were again welcomed back and the divorce law was res-
cinded. The harsh law of civil marriages was modified so
that religious marriages were tolerated as long as they were
immediately registered with a judge or notary. "But it
proved to be merely the calm before the storm—the most de-
vastating storm ever experienced by the Catholic Church in
Colombia.
"
1
3
1
2
Mecham, p. 122
.
1
3
Ibid
. ,
p. 123
.
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The next two decades, until the election of Rafael
Nunez m 1880, have been regarded as the most severe period
of State anticlericalism. 14 The President of Colombia, in
1861, in the name of "protection," denied the independence
and integrity of the Church by declaring "that no cleric
could exercise his religious functions without the authoriza-
tion of the president of the republic or government of a
state. Similar radical decrees were made, climaxing with
the Constitution of 1863, legally separating the spheres of
Church and State. Many clergy protested the persecution of
the Church and several were exiled for voicing their opposi-
tion .
Following the downfall of this particular regime, the
Liberals continued to control government, but enacted less
extreme policies toward Catholics. Yet, the civil war in 1876
highlighted the deep division parting the Colombian masses
over the religious issue. It has been asserted that the civil
struggle was a clerical revolution." 1
6
Much of the protest
was directed against the secularization of Colombian society,
in particular, the inclination to extinguish Church control
of the educational system. In response, the clergy in certain
areas ignored government directives and organized their own
schools
.
Holt
,
p. 29.
1
5
Mecham, p. 123.
1
6
Fals Borda, p. 109.
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President Nunez, a Liberal-turned-Conservative
,
resur-
rected the Church to its previously privileged position in
the mid 1880's, Under his guidance, a new Constitution was
framed, "which continues to be the fundamental law under which
Colombians are governed today, [it] was significant religiously
in that it recognized the primacy of the Catholic Church and
symbolized the triumph of the clerical party." 17
A key element of the Constitution of 1886 was the
authorization of a Concordat between the Colombian government
and the Papacy in Rome, The Concordat, signed in 1887, esta-
blished Catholicism as the state religion, further strength-
ening its official status as it was written into the Consti-
tution. The Church regained full control of the national
educational system, its privileges were restored and it was
compensated by the government for damages caused by prior
Liberal government confiscation of Church property. 18 The
Concordat was hailed by clerical authorities as a model for
Church-State relations.
The Church consolidated its power and influence during
the Conservative hegemony of fifty years, from 1880-1930. The
most significant occurrence during this period was the Liber-
al's implicit acceptance of Catholicism as the predominant
1
7
Meehan, p, 126,
1
8
Holt
,
p. 175.
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religion in Colombia. Essentially, this signified a minimi-
zation of the religious issue as a major determinant of party
policy.
The Liberal Party, in power from 1930-1946, no longer
tried to unseat the Church from its privileged place, but it
did attempt to modify the Church's secular role. The main
thrust of some constitutional amendments and a revision of
the 1887 Concordat was aimed at limiting clerical control
over education. However, the government weakly exercised its
educational prerogatives } 9
Conservatives regained governmental leadership from
1946 to 1953 and attempted to gather mass support by coaxing
the Church into direct secular reinvolvement in support of
Conservative ideology. 20 This period in Colombian history was
perhaps the bloodiest and most immediately damaging to the
Church. An anti-Church fury spread throughout the country
following the assassination of the Liberal leader, Jorge
Eliecar Gaitan, in Bogota. "Churches, convents, ecclesiasti-
cal colleges, schools and institutions were burned and the
clergy were seized, killed, and in some cases, horribly
mutilated." 21 It has been suspected that the rioting was
1
9
Mecham
,
p . 134
,
20 John Martz
,
Colombia: A Contemporary Political Sur -
vey, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1962, p. 26.
21 Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Mill ions, Mi l itary
Rule and the Social Revolut ion in Colombia, 1930-1956, Pitts-
burgh: University of^Pittsburgh Press, 19"5T^ p^ 103
.
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Communist-inspired, in light of the fact that physical at-
tacks upon the Church were "uncharacteristically unColombian .
"
22
It has also been suggested that the attacks revealed a latent
belligerency among city dwellers toward the Church. 23
Reaction by the Government turned the bloodshed
against the Liberals. The bulk of the Church hierarchy
aligned with the Conservatives, even though the highest cler-
ical authorities condemned the violence and urged that clergy
refrain from supporting either party. A number of parish
priests aggressively supported the Conservative attack on
the Liberals and actively discriminated against them. In some
areas, prelates refused to administer the sacraments to Liber-
als, denied their burial in Church cemeteries and demanded that
they vote against their own party's candidates for political
office. "Because most Protestants were also Liberals, the
line between religious persecution and political violence be-
came at times difficult to draw." 24
Rojas Pinilla extended the Government's anti-Liberal
policy and under his tutelage, religious discrimination against
non-Catholics was increased. For example, a treaty was
2 2 Ibid.
,
p. 103.
23 Corr, p. 65.
2 4 Dix
. ,
p . 3 09.
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negotiated with the Vatican banning all non-Catholic activi-
ty in most of the Country. 25 At first, a close relationship
between his regime and the Church prevailed. However, as the
Government degenerated into a reactionary dictatorship and
as police repression grew, more and more priests denounced
Rojas. Finally, Rojas and the institutional Church parted
when the dictator announced plans to perpetuate himself in
power
.
The withdrawal of Church support from the Rojas Pin-
illa regime was a key sign not only marking the changing
^^i-tudes among the clergy, but highlighting divisions within
the Church. The reasons for the abrupt shift in Church policy
are not only indicative of some traditional patterns of beha-
vior, but they shed light on one aspect of the Colombian Church
which has yet to be examined.
In the past, the Church supported governments which,
in turn, protected its interests. But Rojas, in attempting to
indefinitely extend his rule, believed that he no longer needed
the Church's stamp of approval. The Church, recognizing that
this situation was not in its best interests, withdrew its
support
.
Another reason for the abandonment of Church support
was the growing humanistic attitude among the clergy. A small
2 5Martz, p. 215.
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minority who were concerned with the spiritual and pastoral
message of the Church became a vocal group in the institution
and helped sway Church influence behind those opposing Rojas
Pinilla
.
With the regime becoming more dictatorial, the his-
torical schism between Liberals and Conservatives became
minimized to the extent that both sides joined in opposition
to the government. This is reflected in the coalition between
two factions within the Church, clergy who viewed the Church
from a traditional political perspective and those taking a
modern humanistic approach. These two groups in the past
were on opposite sides of the Conservative-Liberal fence.
However, the schism between those supporting the traditional,
political perspective as opposed to the humanistic approach
was broached in their disapproval of the Rojas Pinilla regime,
similar to the rapprochement between the Liberals and Con-
servatives .
The minority which effectively voiced humanistic
ideals in the late 1950's developed out of individual action
in the 1940 's. At that time, there were clergy who refused to
view conflict in Colombian society from the singular perspec-
tive of Liberal-Conservative politics. Instead, they perceived
the growing division among the masses as a consequence of
various pressures bearing down upon the country. With an ex-
tremely realistic, yet compassionate frame of mind, some clergy
proceeded to take steps to counter these new forces.
56
A radio station in the village of Sutatenza, commonly
referred to as Radio Sutatenza, was initiated by a clergyman
in 1947 to combat illiteracy and to raise the standard of
living among the lower classes. Also in the late 1940 's, the
Jesuits helped found the Colombian Workers Union (UTC) a
labor confederation organized chiefly to counter alleged
Communist infiltration in the Colombian Workers Federation.
(As a point of clarification, clerical opposition to the Com-
munists, though a seemingly political reaction, was based on
Communist disdain for religion.) Many other social programs
were begun at that time, not only to counter those set up by
non-Catholics, but to raise the consciousness of the Colombian
masses
.
With the ouster of Rojas Pinilla and the formation of
the National Front, these and other programs grew and multi-
plied under the auspices of the institutional Church. Often-
times, the institutional Church has latched onto such programs
and transformed them into instruments of propaganda. The
bipartisan "party system" of government established by the
National Front 26 allowed the Church to concentrate on its
role as political neutral, rather than as political partisan. 27
But more importantly, the Church could redirect the energies
which it had funneled into political competition in the past
and turn them upon its own organization.
2
6
Corr, p. 10,
27 Dix., p. 314.
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At approximately the same time, Pope John XXIII was
encouraging a modernization of the Catholic Church. The en-
cyclicals emerging from Vatican II sought a more positive,
open attitude among the clergy. These efforts by the Vatican
certainly strenghtened the conviction and hope of those Colom-
bian priests who looked for a greater, more progressive leader-
ship role in their country in the future.
Since the formation of the National Front, Radio Suta-
tenza has developed into Accion Cultural Popular (ACPO)
. This
enlarged program oversees extension courses, distributes books,
and teaches reading and writing, agricultural skills, health
and nutritional care, religion, etc. ACPO also publishes a
weekly paper, EL Campesino
,
which has claimed nation-wide
readership. The Church has used these resources, of radio
broadcasts
,
books and newspapers, to publicize its positions
on various issues. For example, the Church in 1961, advocated
the passage of a governmental law supporting agrarian reform.
Through its vast media networks, "the Church has made it clear
that it regards the concentration of landowner ship in a few
hands as one of the keys to the country's social ills and that
in its view the more equitable division of the land is an ur-
gent matter." 28 In 196 9, to lend credence to this policy, the
Church announced that it would hand over its unused farm lands
2 8 Ibid
. ,
p. 316
.
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to the governmental agency overseeing agrarian reform for
distribution. 29
Other avenues of charitable action have been developed
by the Church, again emanating from individual initiatives.
In Bogota in the late 1950's, a model for urban community
living was founded, called the Minuto de Dios. Since then,
this program has been adopted by various parishes, aimed at
attacking the poor living conditions prevalent in the barrios.
The threat of Protestantism
, and at the same time, the
ecumenical attitude urged by the Pope have led to the adoption
of new strategies by the Church to deal with the inroads made
by other Christian faiths. The use of violence to thwart Pro-
testantism was abandoned and replaced by "an intensive pro-
gram of Catholic indoctrination and education so as to render
Colombian Catholics impervious to Protestant propaganda." 30
The previously established program of Accion Cultural Popular
was appropriated for this purpose. From an altogether differ-
ent approach, the Church eased relations with the Protestants
by uniting with them in an effort to ward off the common
threat of Communism.
Another reason for the shift in clerical attitudes has
to do with the internal organization of the Church. Since
the 50' s and 60’ s, fewer sons of the upper classes have been
29 Corr, p. 68.
30Mecham, p. 135.
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entering the priesthood, resulting in a more liberal make-up
of Church personnel. In addition, fewer men are entering
the priesthood, making for a scarcity of personnel. This
situation has been partially remedied by Papal efforts to im-
port foreign priests into Latin American countries suffering
from this problem. Today, about one-half of the Colombian
clergy are foreign born. 31 This has signified an infusion
of relatively liberal-minded priests into the conservative
Colombian Catholic Church,
One significant consequence of the liberalization of
Church personnel has been efforts by clergy to make their
activities more responsive to the needs of the Colombian
masses. Two research centers, the Center of Social Research
(-1-C0DICS) and the Jesuit Center of Social Action and Research
(CIAS) were organized to evaluate Church resources and the
Church relationship to the masses. Since their inception they
have developed into very large and sophisticated management
organizations, contracting with foreign governments and other
organizations outside of the realm of the Catholic Church.
It is certainly reasonable and more interesting to
simply discuss the contemporary Colombian Church in terms of
the progressive, act ion—oriented role of many clergy. However,
compared to other Latin American Churches, the Colombian Church
3 1 Dix, p. 319.
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remains conservative in its policies and attitudes. It is
important to remember that those promoting change within
the Church and a greater leadership role within Colombian
society are still a minority. in addition, many of the new
inroads taken by this group have not been as productive as
they had hoped. For instance, ICODES and CIAS, though repre-
senting not only new' roles for the Church, but a centraliza-
tion of Church authority, have at times been so competitive
for the available scarce resources, that they have often
lost sight of their prescribed alms. 32 Another obstacle
which the Church has not yet overcome, is the way in which it
is attempting to relate to the masses. The success of many
of its programs has been diminished because it continues to
respond to the people in a paternalistic
,
authoritarian man-
ner .
In attempting to form an overview of the contemporary
Colombian Church, we can note an intriguing development:
division within the Church. It is apparent that the conserva-
tive element within the institution is still predominant.
Yet, a minority of clergy is visibly emerging, anxious to
change the traditional role of the Church in Colombia. The
3
2
David Mutchler, The Church as a Political Factor in
Latin America, with_particular^ referenc e to Colombia and Chile ,
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971; see also, "Adaptations
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The Meaning of Internal Church Conflict," in The Roman Catho-
lic Church in Modern Latin America, by Karl M, Schmitt, New
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most striking example of internal division is highlighted by
the actions and philosophy of Camilio Torres. He has been
cast as the ultimate symbol of the priest who is frustrated
and angered by the lethargic, elitist, hierarchical nature of
the institutional Church, yet imbued with the spirit and mes-
sage of Christianity.
The rebel priest gradually broke away from the Church,
first by working within the bounds of the clerical hierarchy
to promote change, and eventually joining guerilla forces,
abandoning the Church as a springboard for action. Essen-
tially, the acceptance of violence as a means to achieving
prescribed goals marks the division between Torres, the Gol-
conda group and others, on the one hand, and the institutional
Church.
Since the independence period, the Church has dealt
with problems, has responded to the people's needs and has
sought change via its assumed role as legitimator, pacifier
and arbiter, within the political structure of Colombian soci-
ety. In fact, its tacit acceptance of the political system
and its accommodation to the machinations of Colombian poli-
tics have been scorned by Torres and his successors. These
characteristics of the Church, as they have been perceived
by this group, have not only signalled division within the
Church, but have marked the abandonment of the Church by a
number of radical priests since the actions of Camilio Torres.
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Five Faces of the Church
In the introductory chapter, we outlined the different
"faces" of the Latin American Catholic Church. At this junc-
ture, we will briefly note these five aspects in relation to
the Church in Colombia.
For the most part, we have discussed the Colombian
Church in view of its relations with the state,. It is appar-
ent that the Church has been an integral part of the Colombian
political system. Not only has it sought acceptance and sup-
port within the elitist political sphere, but it has often
been the cause of political strife. The role of the Church
in politics has grown from that of a partisan activist to an
ardent conciliator. Throughout Colombian history, it has
developed in line with the emerging political atmosphere,
chiefly to guard its religious monopoly and influence in the
social and political spheres. Similarly, it has remained a
conservative force, supporting the mainstream of Colombian
political activity centered around the Liberal and Conserva-
tive Parties. To be sure, as elitist parties themselves, the
Church has easily accommodated to their basic interests.
Papal-Church relations have been particularly enlight-
ening in the case of Colombia. For example, the Concordat of
1887 further legalized and legitimated the authority of the
Catholic Church in Colombia. The Papacy has tried to deter-
mine the direction of the Latin American churches through
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various decrees. We can clearly see that the trends toward
modernizing the Church and gearing it towards greater spiri-
tual activity have become evident in Colombia in recent years.
Since the formation of the National Front, in particular,
the Church has begun to follow these paths, evidenced most
clearly in the increasing number of priests who are working
more closely with the people by broadening their social, pas-
toral activity. The development of organizations like ICODES
and CIAS also are prime examples of the Church's efforts to
restructure from within.
Compared to other state churches, the consistency of
the Colombian Church, with regard to its conservative posture
and pervasive influence, gives it the appearance of a mono-
lithic Church. This is clearly not the case, particularly
in recent Colombian history. Division among the clergy is
marked by an emerging clerical group concerned with the
spiritual-social sphere of the Church, no longer content with
voicing its message via the traditional political machinery.
Attempts by this growing minority to respond and relate directly
to the Colombian people also signals a different approach from
those choosing violence as a means to fulfilling their goals.
The personnel make-up (the depletion of the priestly ranks and
the changing clerical class structure) also is contributing
to a revamping of the hierarchical structure.
In spite of some anti-clerical regimes in the 19th
century, the religious dominance of the Catholic Church in
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Colombia was never threatened. To be sure, the Constitution
of 1886 and the Concordat of the following year secured the
Church's religious monopoly. However, the 20th century
ushered into Latin America new trends and movements, chal-
lenging the authority of the Church. Protestantism, in par-
ticular, appeared so threatening that not only the Church,
but its supportive political system, literally attacked it.
The ecumenical attitude of Pope John XXIII and a realization
that Protestant inroads could best be fought at the grass-
roots level, have helped to shift the clerical attack away
from the violent front. In addition, the modernization of
Colombia has had an enormous effect on the Church. Rather
than back away from technological advancements, the Church
has taken full advantage of them. For instance, the devel-
opment of mass media networks has been a major source for
disseminating Church positions and policies. In this way,
the Church has been able to effectively counter threats, such
as Protestant conversions among the Colombian people.
The Church response to a changing environment is a
contemporary and perhaps more exciting and hopeful way of
viewing the Church. The altered political environment resulting
from the formation of the National Front calls to mind some
of the implications we noted earlier concerning Christian
Democracy. We conjecture that one result of Christian Demo-
cracy was to remove the Church directly from politics. 33
33 See Chapter I of this thesis, p. 32.
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Similarly, in Colombia, the Church was effectively released
from political activity because "it gained the support of both
the Liberal and Conservative parties,"** thereby negating
its reason for partisanship. The emerging social, pastoral-
oriented minority of clergy is clearly a response to changing
societal demands and needs.
Adaptation
After reviewing these five "faces," it is obvious
that no single perspective adequately serves as a general
framework, forming a clear image of the Colombian Church.
There is a need for a broader overview, if we are to fully
comprehend the posture of the Church in Colombia. The all-
encompassing theme of adaptation, which was suggested in the
first chapter
,
serves to illustrate how and why the Church
has been able to endure the past 150 years in Colombia. To
be sure, the most remarkable aspect of the Church in many
Latin American nations is its ability to persist in the most
turbulent of political, social, or economic climates.
From a pragmatic standpoint, the chief concern of the
Church is to survive and to maintain its authoritative posi-
tion in society. Of course, the ultimate concern of the Church
is to spread the message of Christianity. With this basic
premise at hand, the actions and attitudes of the Colombian
3 4Corr, p. 65.
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Church through history become understandable. For example,
during the independence period, the Church transferred its
loyalties from Spain to those in Colombia who were willing
to support it. This action planted the seeds of partisanship
between the Church and the Liberal Party. it also signalled
the politically conservative, elitist posture which the Church
would adopt for the future. When the traditional political
loyalties proved no longer satisfactory or necessary, the
Church sought support from other sources of power and influ-
ence. This is certainly one way of interpreting the currently
shifting Church posture vis-a-vis social reform. "Undoubtedly
the new outlook represents the adaptation of a basically con-
servative institution to conditions challenging its survival."
As we noted previously, the Church is slow to move in
new directions. Stimulus from Rome, particularly since the
ecumenical era forged by Pope John XXIII, is frequently noted
as attributing to the initial signs of a new spirit in the
Colombian Church. Changing class loyalties among clergy have
also contributed to new attitudes within the Church. The
trend toward more middle class men seeking religion as a vo-
cation has signalled a shift away from ties to the elite of
Colombian society. The threat of Protestantism and other move
ments siphoning off some of the Church's mass support has led
the Church to confront this challenge by instituting new and
constructive programs on the grass-roots level.
3 5 Dix, p. 316.
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The response by the Church to the Rojas Pinilla regime
is yet another example of its basic inclination to survive.
When Rojas declared his intention to extend his rule, imply-
ing that he did not need the Church to further legitimate
his actions, the Church threw its support behind his opposi-
tion. Yet, the fact that it waited to the final moment to
shift its support, points to the overly cautious nature of
the Church.
The relationship between the Church and Rojas Pinilla
highlights an additional aspect of Church-State relations.
The clerical institution wants to act as a legitimator, as a
source of support. In addition, in a subtle way, it points
to the ruling authority's need for something or someone with
authority to publicly approve of its tenure and actions.
We can identify numerous examples from Church history
in Colombia where its actions were rooted in its desire and
need to survive. In continuing with this line of thought,
we can generalize about the Church's means to persisting. In
just about every case, the Church has adapted its policies or
actions or attitudes to maintain its societal position. It
has rarely taken the initiative, but has acted as the follow-
er. In fact, the Church has often found itself legitimating
action begun by others. This role is not to be interpreted
as accidental, for it benefits the privileged position of the
Church to act as a legitimator as opposed to an initiator of
social and political change.
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CHAPTER III
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHILE
The Chilean Church is considered by many to be the
most reform-oriented, progressive Church in Latin America. 1
However, when judging the conservative/liberal posture of the
Church, the Chilean masses work from a different perspective.
Their yardstick in determining the political inclinations of
the Chilean Church is other institutions within the Chilean
state. According to this framework, dating back to the inde-
pendence period, we can observe a Church with a varied poli-
tical history, identified with groups having both conserva-
tive and liberal leanings.
For most of the 1800's, the political climate in
Chile was similar to that of many other Latin American coun-
tries. Two parties. Conservative and Liberal, were vying for
P°^ ;i-tical power. Generally speaking, the Conservative Party
was assocaited with the pro-clerical movement. The Liberals
sought separation of Church and State and the confinement of
Church concerns to the religious sphere. The chief political
activity of the Church, in these times, was centerd on its
opposition to the ideals and goals of the Liberal Party and
the ascension of the Conservative Party to governmental rule.
2 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control and
Modernization in Latin America
,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 135.
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We can observe the 19th and early 20th century from
the viewpoint of the gradual separation of Church and State
and the waning of clerical political authority. By the time
the Church was officially disestablished from the State in
1925, a considerable shift had occurred with regard to the
perceived role of the Church in Chilean society. Roughly from
the late 1920 ’s to the present, the reformist, progressive
wing of the Chilean Church has gradually become the dominant
force within the clerical institution. As a result of this,
the Church has acted as the legitimator of actions initiated
by the more liberal-minded political leaders.
The progressive posture of the Catholic Church in
Chile today is unique, particularly when it is compared to
other Latin American churches. The following examination,
however, will not focus on such a comparative study, but
will attempt to analyze this curious phenomenon within the
context of Chilean history. The political directions of the
Chilean government
,
changing social attitudes, and the dyna-
mics of internal/external forces working upon the Church have
all contributed over the years to shape the Chilean Catholic
Church into an institution supportive of progressive policies
and actions. Of particular interest in Chilean clerical his-
tory are such points as: the effect of "freedom of religion"
on the Catholic Church, the continual growth of Protestantism,
the influence of papal directives, the role of the Church
with regard to Christian Democracy, and the relationship
between the Church and military rule.
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In the following study, we will focus on that point
in Chilean history when the Church began to evolve into a
progressive institution. A more intensive examination will
detail the longevity, direction, and implications of the
transition.
Though the 19th century will not be examined in such
close scrutiny, we will identify those elements in early
Church history which point to the change in the Chilean Church
of the 20th century. Certain elements will be studied because
they constitute either a common response among Latin American
churches or are unique to the Chilean experience.
As in the previous case study, the 20th century Church
will be highlighted in this section. The official year of
separation of Church and State in 1925 is the key. This date
not only marks the climax of changing societal attitudes con-
cerning the Catholic Church, but it also signals the beginning
of new directions within the Chilean Church.
Church History
During the independence era, strong feelings were pre-
valent among Chileans as to the place of the Church in society.
In fact, little divided the Liberal from the Conservative
Party other than the issues of education and religion. Regard-
less of which party was in power
,
the Church was graced with
favored treatment in the early years. The Constitution of
1818 denied freedom of religion to other faiths and assumed
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governmental guardianship of the Roman Catholic Church.
Despite Liberal rule from 1823 to 1830, the various state
constitutions which were ratified during this time, shared
similar policies of supporting the role of the Catholic Church
m Chilean society. 2 Even in the somewhat religiously liberal
Constitution of 1828, the Church retained its favored status
while public observance of other religions was declared il-
legal
.
3
However, it is important to note that the Catholic
religion was never wholly embraced by the Chilean government.
We can sense a tendency for religious toleration by the govern-
ment even at this early stage of statehood. For instance,
the Constitution of 1828, approved during the Freire regime,
sanctioned the private worship of other faiths.4 These initial
inclinations toward toleration mark the beginning of greater
openness among the Chilean masses toward minority faiths.
This undercurrent continued to grow throughout the
1800's, eventually culminating in the separation of Church
and State. Not only were the rumblings of religious toleration
2 L loyd Mecham
,
Church a
n
d State in Latin America
,
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1^66,
p . 205
.
3 James Petras, Pol it ic s and Social Forces in Chilean
Development, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969,
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being felt in the early to mid 1800 <s, but the "domination
of the Church and the religious spirit of Chileans were grad-
ually waning. i n the 1840’s, a daily newspaper, El Mer-
curio, spoke out for religious toleration. 6 In several in-
stances, on public occasions, the government exercised res-
traint in their deference to high clerical personages. 7
Though these changes may seem insignificant, they were indi-
cative of the general drift of public opinion.
8
Obviously, it was very difficult for the Church to
confront any pervasive shift in the public attitude toward
the Church. However, it could effectively and vigorously
attach individual actions, such as the newspaper's pronounce-
ments on religious freedom. In response to El Mercurio, the
Church "produced a great scandal and under the protection of
the Archbishop, LaRevista Catolica (The Catholic Review) was
founded to undertake the defense of the Church, threatened by
the movement, subversive to its dogma, which appeared to be
breaking out among the intellectual youth of the period. 1,8
5 Ib id
.
,
p. 2 09.
6Luis Galdames, A History of Chile, translated and
edited by Isaac Joslin CoxT^cHapel Hill: 'The University of
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The balance of the 1800's, up through the rule of
Ba lmaceda in the late 1880^s,was marked by attempts to legis-
late religious freedom and the disassociation of Church and
state. The mid to latter 1800 "s were the testing grounds for
the spread of Protestantism and the secularization of Chilean
society. Coincidentally, the Liberals administered the govern-
ment from 1861 to 1891 forging, via legislation, a compara-
tively "liberal" government.
Ironically
,
even when Conservatives were in power, the
clergy were restrained by the government. 10 in the mid 1800's
three acts were passed which, in effect, thrust the State into
a watchdog position. For example, the government had the
right to make certain that curates fulfilled their responsi-
kilities. 1 During the second term of Montt in the 1850 's,
the President was accused by the Church of actually inter-
fering in its internal affairs by overruling the decision of
an ecclesiastical tribunal
.
11 The higher clergy not only ob-
jected to this aggressive governmental behavior, but found
that internal dissension over such issues weakened the ability
of the Church to effectively confront them.
1
0
Lloyd Mecham, p. 208.
1 1 Ibid.
1 2 James Petras, p. 89.
Religious toleration was practiced to some extent by
the Chilean government prior to any legislation. For example,
in 1847, when the Protestant Union Church organized and built
a structure as its house of worship, the government did not
interfere, "The constitutional phrase 'public exercise' was
generally regarded as not prohibiting religious worship of
non-Catholics inside buildings.
" Such governmental atti-
tudes were forged into law in 1865 when the Congress adopted
the Ley Interpretation, attempting to insure religious free-
dom. Though a constitutional amendment to this effect failed
congressional ratif icat ion, the fact remained that limited
religious freedom had been publicly recognized.
The early 1870's was a crucial period, not only for
the status of the Church in Chile but also for the coalition
government. At that time, the so-called four "theological
questions" were being considered by those in power:
1. the suppression of ecclesiastical privilege
2. the secularization of cemeteries
3. civil marriages
4. separation of Church and State.
Because the passage of legislation settling these issues
would severely challenge the status of the Church, the govern-
mental coalition of Liberals and Conservatives fought bitterly.
Two moderate reform measures finally were approved: the
Lloyd Mecham, p. 207.
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clergy were to be judged by civil courts and certain areas of
Catholic cemeteries were to be opened to other faiths. (Even
these reforms were only passed after the Conservatives were
ousted from the government.) Reforms affecting civil mar-
riages and separation of Church and State were not authorized
at this time, although the Liberal forces within the govern-
ment were intent upon eventually enacting these two programs.
The clergy violently objected to the two moderate
measures passed by the government and they did not hesitate
to speak out in many public forums. 14 Clerical objections
proved to be effective in the sense that the government failed
to pass an extensive clerical reform program. On the other
hand, "the reformas teologicas seriously weakened the Chilean
Church; in a formal encounter it had been defeated and humil-
iated; its prestige was shaken and thereafter it was placed
on the defensive." 15
However, during the presidency of Domingo Santa Maria
(1881-1886) cemeteries were completely removed from the con-
trol of the Church and civil marriages were legalized. In
response, the Church aggressively opposed these reforms. Con-
cerning the civil marriage law, the clergy vigorously protested
and even threatened to refrain from officiating at the marriage
1
4
Luis Galdames, p. 317.
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of anyone who had supported the governmental policy. 16 They
so severely condemned the secularization of the cemeteries
that governmental authorities temporarily closed some Catho-
lic cemeteries. 17
Perhaps the most symbolic blow to the status of the
Church was in the realm of education. In Chile, as in most
other Latin American nations, the position of the Church in
society has been buttressed by its control of education.
"The effective weakening of the [Chilean] Church was symbolized
by the measure of 1879, which made religious instruction in
the public schools no longer obligatory." 18
^Ibh the passage of these various reform measures,
the clerical vs. anti-clerical split becamse quiescent. 19 By
the late 1880's, essentially no real barries existed between
the Liberal and Conservative Parties, save the formal separ-
ation of Church and State. However, the manner in which
separation would be attained and the extent of separation was
to bewilder the Chilean government, clerical institution and
people for another thirty years. But those who sought the
1
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disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church were determined,
as was indicated by the Minister of the Interior near the end
of the 19th century: "Between the partisans of definite and
immediate separation of Church and State, and the partisans
of gradual and progressive separation, there is no difference
of doctrine. There s only a difference of procedure. We
will advance step by ‘step with perfect security and we propose
to arrive at the goal." 20
The transition between the enactment of the reform
measures and the legal separation of Church and State in 1925
is an interesting period in Chilean Church history. Para-
doxically, the Church violently opposed the reform measures
of the 1800 s, yet passively, even with some optimism, ac-
cepted the separation in the 1900's. The explanation for this
radical change in behavior can be found by studying the Church
and society in the intervening years of the "transition" period.
Prior to this time, the state had had poor relations
with the Papacy. After some altercations with the Pope over
the state's choice for filling a vacant archbishopric, the
state assumed patronage over the Church. During the Balmaceda
rule, in the late 1880 's, the President attempted to assuage
the wounded Church by reestablishing state relations with the
Vatican
,
2 o tloyd Meehan, p. 215.
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The position which had remained vacant was filled by
a cleric who was interested in easing Church-State relations.
In 1895, Archbishop Mariano Casanova called a diocesan synod
which focused on the internal organization of the national
Church. 21 In 1905, he convened a solemn eucharistic congress,
where religious dogmas were reaffirmed. 22 Some important events
occurred at this congress which were to affect the position
of the Church with regard to the State in the future.
A Catholic University in Santiago and various schools
and colleges were founded. These acts helped vitalize the
Church because it gave the clerical institution the opportunity
to educate young men in a religious environment. 23 Also, an
appeal was made to the working class to join Catholic labor
associations, supervised by clerics. Justification for such
actions of Christian socialism was founded in the contempor-
aneous encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII. 24
These initial, but crucial, undertakings signalled
the beginning of a different and dynamic relationship between
the Church and the Chilean people and the State. Observers
often characterize this period as a time of marked religious
21 Luis Galdames, p. 43 0.
2 2 Ibid.
2 3
^id
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evolution. Apparently, a shift in societal attitudes
regarding the Catholic Church also developed in Chile at this
time. A general religious indifference and tolerance came
over the people. (This is not to say that they were leaving
the Church or that Protestantism was directly challenging
Roman Catholic religious authority.) This was evidenced by
a relaxation in the observance of Catholic rituals and fewer
number of people attending Mass. Even the political orienta-
tion of many clergy was waning
. The type of priest who had
been directly involved in the political controversy over the
theological questions was less visible. 26
Ironically, the Church in this period has also been
noted for nurturing the respect and allegiance of the people,
which it had lost over political battles in the late 1800's.
Apparently, this developed because the Church was gradually
moving away from the political sphere and confining itself
to the "religious" domain and to constructive social activity.
Some observers charge that the Church finally learned the value
of keeping above politics and away from any direct political
involvement
.
2 7
These characteristics of the period and of the Church
help describe the environment in which separation occurred.
2
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Also significant was the transfer of governmental power to
the Radical and Democratic Parties in 1920. The Radical
Party in particular, had a history of promoting anti-clerical
policies. According to newly-elected President Allessandri,
"When ministers become affiliated with political groups, they
compromise the sacred interests of their charge. The future
of the Church, the most precious interests of religion, are
then tied up to the fortunes of a party. " 2
8
The sense of this statement was written into the Con-
stitution of 1925. Basically, the new Constitution voided
all previous lav/s concerning Church-State relations. Church
property acquired before the 1925 Constitution was to remain
in the hands of the religious institution, and the government
agreed to subsidize the Church for a brief period of time for
the loss of its many privileges. 29 The Church no longer con-
trolled the educational system, although it was permitted to
establish and maintain its own schools. "The Chilean Consti-
tution thus effectively freed the Church of political con-
straints, and set the stage (largely unexpectedly) for its
revitalization into what is today one of Latin America's most
progressive Churches.
"
3
0
2 8 Lloyd Mechajn, p, 218,
29Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile
,
Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, Co., 19667 pT" 90
.
3Q Luigi Einaudi, Richard Maulin, Alfred Stepan, Michael
Fleet, Latin American Institutional Development: The Changing
Catholic Church, The Rand Corporation, 1969, p. 5.
81
Surprisingly, very few protests among clergy or lay-
men were voiced in 1925. 31 Apparently, the clergy either
realized that it would have been futile to contest such govern-
mental efforts or that they believed such action was benefi-
cial. In any case, the government's position was made easier
when, in 1922, the Primate of Chile, Archbishop Errazuriz of
Santiago declared that "the Church is not responsible for the
actions of any political party, nor does it attempt to influ-
ence them, leaving them completely independent." 32 Remarkably,
Chile resolved the Church State controversy without bloodshed
and in a spirit of marked fellowship on all sides. 33
Following the disassociat ion of Church and State in
Chile, Catholicism did not decline as many Conservatives and
clerics had predicted. To the contrary, the prestige and
authority of the Roman Catholic Church seemed to grow. 34
Some unique and far-reaching trends did develop after the
disestablishment of the Catholic Church. Legal guarantees
of religious freedom created a favorable climate for the
growth of Protestantism. Clerics with more liberal, social-
oriented ideologies actively sought recognition. Two Jesuits,
Fernando Vives del Solar and Jorge Fernandez Pradel, "founded
^Luis Galdames, p. 430.
32 Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile,
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 191T5., p. T8T7
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33 Lloyd Mecham, p. 219,
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labor unions and credit, housing, and consumers' cooperatives
and at the same time spread Catholic social doctrine among
the students of Santiago's Catholic University," 35 m con_
junction with these activities, they introduced the litera-
ture of European Christian Social Movements to many Chilean
students.
There were a number of bishops who wanted to reesta-
blish ties with the Conservative Party. They reacted to the
subversive" activites of these two Jesuits and the movement
they were initiating. However, the influence of the progres-
sive Jesuits was crucial in securing the favor of the Papacy
to thwart the bishops' efforts. The Vatican Secretary of
State "settled the matter once and for all by reiterating the
prohibition of party activites by clergymen and by again
stressing that no political party could claim the right to
exclusive representation of the Catholics." 36
The events of the 1920’s and early 1930's set the
stage for three major developments affecting the Roman Catho-
lic Church: the growth of Protestantism, the development of
a reform-oriented posture within the Church, and the rise of
Christian Democracy in Chile.
The effective approval of freedom of religion in 1925
paved the way for the growth of Protestantism. Even prior to
3
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this official act, Protestant sects had secured a foothold
in Chile, as we noted earlier. However, since the seculari-
zation of the Chilean State, they have made substantial gains
—
so much so, that by the mid~20th century, 10,8% of the Chilean
people could be identified as belonging to a Protestant sect, 37
the highest percentage of Protestants in any Latin American
country.
This relatively high percentage has caused legitimate
fears among Catholics about the susceptibility of Chileans
to Protestantism. The threat of Protestantism and the fact
that they have made inroads in Catholic territory, especially
in the lower classes where the Church has been traditionally
weak, has been one major reason for the emergence of reform-
oriented priests.
This brings us to the next development: the rise of
progressive priests within the clerical ranks. The separation
of Church and State and the various statements on neutrality
seem to have had the effect of drawing out the diverse view-
points among the clergy. The most prevalent viewpoint is that
of the progressive clergy. Their programs have also been the
most effective in confronting Protestantism and the ideologi-
cal movements of the Left (Socialism and Communism)
.
3 7 Lloyd Mecham, p, 222.
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Other events have occurred which have shaped the pro-
gressive posture of the Chilean Church. Roughly from 1929
to World War II, a select group of reform-oriented clergy
emerged within the Chilean Church, confronting the conserva-
tive hierarchy. They initiated programs and sparked the in-
terest of students and Chileans outside of the hierarchical
structure, inspiring a leftist political movement of Catholic
laymen, prefiguring the Christian Democratic Party. 38 Several
episcopal appointments within the Chilean Church since the
late 1930 s also have assured the institution of progressive
leadership. Between 1955 and 1964, the Church collected a
corps of clerical and lay experts from within Chile and in
Europe to help redirect its programs. 39
As a prime example of reform-oriented efforts to
reach the people and respond to their needs, we can cite the
Catholic Action Program. On a local level, bishops have
sponsored lay organizations in an attempt to stimulate a
militant enthusiasm for spreading the spiritual message and
influence of the Church. 40 Perhaps it has had the greatest
impact at the ideological level. Catholic Action programs
have "generated a reform-oriented social Catholicism that
has played a key role in the Christian Democratic political
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movements. It was decisive in Chile for turning a certain
number of Catholic youth away from the coalition that the
Church held with the Conservative party. Moreover, it stim-
ulated laymen to see political action as their responsibility,
rather than that of Church officials." 41
There have been additional indications that the Chilean
Church has been pointed in a progressive direction by its own
clergy. Archbishops Crescente Errazuriz and Jose Caro Rod-
^ iguez
,
after the 1925 separation, both encouraged greater
social consciousness among the clergy and supported the mes-
sage of Pope Leo XIII' s Rerum Novarum. Manuel Larrain, the
Bishop of Talca
,
has been a particularly strong supporter
of the reform-oriented goals of the progressive clergy. In
fact, he set a precedent among Chilean clergy by transferring
Church property to tenants. In the spirit of this action,
for instance, in 1961, Chilean bishops decided to sell 13,200
acres of ecclesiastical property to a number of Chilean fami-
lies. The Institute for Agricultural Development was also
organized at that time to oversee the distribution of the
land. 42 The Bishop has advanced the Institute of Rural Educa-
tion, which was developed in the mid 1950's so as to promote
the training of Chilean youth in agriculture and mechanics. 43
4
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He has also stepped outside of the bounds of the Chilean
hierarchy to advance social reform as the President of CELAM,
the Latin American organization of progressive bishops.
The inclusion of Catholic laymen in the clerical ad-
ministrative sphere has had a favorable impact on the Church
reform movement. The trend to draw laymen into the decision-
making process has freed the bishops from some of their ad-
ministrative duties, encouraging the more progressive members
to leave their episcopal residences and establish closer ties
with the marginal peoples in poorer districts. 44
To be sure, with the emergence of reformist lay groups
and activist students, the ecclesiastical establishment has
been less and less "political." Oftentimes, the Church acts
politically, though indirectly, through Catholic lay groups.
Many of these groups have gained prominence, enough to win
victories in the political arena with the best interests of
the Church in mind. For instance
f
they have secured substan-
tial state subsidies for private educational institutions and
Catholic universities have been authorized to grant degrees
of comparable value to those awarded by secular universities.
"The practical monopoly of the Radical Party over the educa-
tional system was broken largely by the ability and dynamism
of Catholic teacher and student groups." 45
4 4 Ibid
.
, p . 13 6.
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This leads us into a discussion of the third major
development affecting the Church: the rise of Christian
Democracy. "The victory of this new party, although not
necessarily a result of Church action, was nevertheless in
harmony with a new trend in Catholic policy in Chile." 46
Much like the effect of Catholic lay groups acting on the
behalf of the Church in the political arena and backed by
Church influence and authority, the Christian Democratic
Movement has had a significant impact on removing the Church
from politics.
Ivan Vallier has advanced this particular theory,
suggesting that,
Catholic reform parties like Chris-
tian Democracy can play a latent role
in helping to institutionalize a pro-
gressively oriented but non-political
Church as well as providing political
arenas for Catholic laymen who opt for
a progressive political type of worldly
action but still want to remain involved
in the Church. Strong and progressive
Christian Democratic parties serve a
twofold function under these circum-
stances :
1) they act as a buffer between
the Church and the political arena;
2) they serve as a safety valve
by providing a meaningful political
arena for laymen who maintain Catholic
orientations but pursue a politics of
reform and change. 47
46 Lloyd Mecham, p. 223.
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Prior to an examination of this theory
, in light of the
Chilean Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic Church
,
we will briefly trace the development of the movement in Chile
and its relationship with the clerical institution.
The Christian Democratic Party was founded in the
mid 1930's by a group of Catholic University students who
had broken away from the Conservative Party. They had organ-
ized in an attempt "to revitalize and increase the popular
appeal of the Conservative Party. But in order to do so,
they advocated policies that threatened the interests of the
oligarchy and profoundly antagonized the party leadership." 48
Their program of social reform began to gain national pro-
minence after the Popular Front, a coalition of several mid-
dle-of-the-road and left-wing parties, consolidated power in
1938. We noted earlier the two Jesuit priests, Fernando Vives
del Solar and Jorge Fernandez Pradel and their efforts to
instill the message of European social movements in Chilean
students. Their actions have also been credited by some for
establishing the environment in which the Christian Democratic
Movement initilaly emerged and for severing the Church's ties
with the Conservative Party. 49
Most observers agree that the Catholic Church is the
inspiration behind the emergence of Christian Democracy. The
link between the two is based on the influence and spirit of
48 Ernst Halperin,p. 179,
4 9 Ibid. ,p. 181.
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the papal encyclicals since Pope Leo XIII issued Rerum Novarum
in 1891. "in fact, it might be said that the entire Chris-
tian Democratic Movement dates from the publication of that
revolutionary document, although three subsequent encyclicals
have also made major contributions to the movement." 50
The Christian Democratic Party in Chile has certainly
benefited from its identification with Catholic thought and
from the new progressive image of the clerical hierarchy.
In taking full advantage, the Party openly promised in the
1950 s to redirect Chile according to the philosophies ex-
pressed in the papal directives from Pope Leo XIII' s Rerum
Novarum to the teachings of Pope Pius XI. 51 In addition,
the Christian base of Chilean society has offered an estab-
lished recruiting pool for the party. 52 Curiously, it is
at this level that the linkage between the Party and the
Church is severed.
Leaders of Christian Democracy have attempted to
refute the common charge that they are a Church-directed party,
by indicating that they recognize religious pluralism as a
mainstay of Chilean society. 53 They claim that the Church in
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no way directs their policies or expects the party’s alle-
giance. This is somewhat confirmed by the fact that the
Church as an institution has never publicly/offioially sup-
ported Christian Democracy. However, the fact that the
party draws its basic philosophy from papal encyclicals and
maintains individual support from progressive priests, is in ap
parent conflict with the Party’s position of non-confession-
alism
.
Rather than take away from the growth of the party,
the confusion over the "Catholicism" of Christian Democracy
served to strengthen the Party through the mid 1960's. The
Party was increasing its membership with those Chileans who
believed in its progressive, humanistic policies and also
with those who believed it to be the Catholic Party. Chris-
tian Democracy was drawing on the membership of those pro-
clerical and centrist parties who in the past, had relied on
Church backing.
The Christian Democratic Movement attained political
maturity in the 1958 election when it gained national stature
under the leadership of Eduardo Frei. Its defeat in this
election was significant. The Conservatives edged out the
leftist coalition, whose candidate was Salvador Allende, by
a mere 33,500 votes. By the 1964 elections, the only serious
contenders for the presidency were Frei and Allende. 54
5 4 Ibid
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.
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Fearing that Allende and his leftist coalition would win,
especially in light of their near-success in the 1958 elec-
tion, the conservative coalition lent its support to Frei.
Frei won easily with 56.1% of the vote as opposed to Allende'
s
38
. 9%. 5 5
The backing by the conservatives falls short of fully
explaining the Christian Democratic victory of 1964 The
Catholic Church feared a socialist or left-wing government.
In fact, one author claims that the Church was so perturbed
over the possibility of an Allende victory, that they peti-
tioned the Jesuit General in Rome to send social scientists
to Chile to help defeat Allende. 56 Roger Vekemans, a Belgian
Jesuit, helped design a series of programs to aid Frei in his
candidacy. It has been charged that his programs were funded
by West German aid agencies and the CIA. 57
There is another factor essential to the Christian
Democratic success: the influence of the female vote. The
unofficial, but active support of the Frei candidacy by the
Church influenced and attracted many of the women voters. It
is an accepted fact that the Roman Catholic Church has an
indominatable hold over women positioned on all rungs of the
b
5
Gary MacEoin, p. 49.
5 6 Ibid.
5 7 Ibid
.
92
economic ladder. 58
women
,
5 9
Over half of the Frei vote was cast by
When Frei took office, he found that the Christian
Democratic Party did not constitute a majority in the Chilean
Senate. He was therefore encouraged to remain open to the
Communist Party, which held critical seats in the Senate. 60
Interestingly enough, this did not upset the relationship
between the Frei regime and the Catholic Church. This shift
in clerical attitudes can be traced back to the effects of
Vatican II, beginning in 1962 and to the progressive nature
of the Chilean hierarchy.
The spirit and ecumencial message of Vatican II were
supported by the progressive clergy in Chile, as well as
clerics in other Latin American nations. This was indicated
particularly in Chile, by a number of clerical actions. Con-
crete programs were institutionalized: "technical training
for campesinos, distribution of Church lands to underprivileged
groups, forming of credit and production cooperatives in some
callampus .
"
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The extent of the changing clerical attitudes was
revealed at the Medellin Conference in Colombia in 1968,
attended by Latin American bishops. The meeting was opened
by Pope Paul and his progressive message was a call for
volunteers to help construct a new order. 62
The bishops closed the conference with a message
stressing the Church's withdrawal from its traditional poli-
tical activities and its involvement in the social and econo-
needs of the marginal masses. 63 An interesting by-product
of this message was the move toward conciliation and coopera-
tion by some clergy with communist and socialist movements.
This is not to imply that there was a massive shift
of allegiance amongst clergy or laymen to leftist parties.
Though Allende was the victor in the 1970 election, it should
be noted that his percentage of the vote decreased relative
to the 1964 election. (He received 38.9% of the vote in 1964
and 36.6% in 1970.) 64 The key to the 1970 victory was the
re-emergence of the split between Christian Democrats and
Conservatives
.
However, there was a minority of clergy who supported
Allende because they were frustrated with the slow progress
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of Christian Democracy. Even though they failed to win the
support of the full hierarchy, they backed Allende and con-
sequently gained prominence with the ascendency of his regime. In
1971, a group of eighty Roman Catholic priests urged Christians
to renounce Christian Democracy and lend their support to
"the revolutionary process.'1 And in 1972, MOO Latin American
priests and laymen ended a week-long conference of 'Christians
for Socialism' in Santiago (May 2) with a call for a 'Strate-
gic alliance between revolutionary Christians and Marxists
for the liberation of the continent.'" 65
The Vatican and the Chilean hierarchy disapproved of
the public support extended to specific political movements.
They continued to profess a belief in the withdrawal of the
Church from the political sphere. This is not to say that
the Church could not persist under a radical form of govern-
ment. To be sure, the clerical institution had little dif-
ficulty living with and working under the Allende government.
In fact, at their annual meeting in 1973, the Chilean bishops
indicated their approval of the overall policies of the pro-
gressive government. 66
The only major issue which aroused Church opposition
during the Allende presidency was a proposal for school
6
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reform which "would establish the National Unified School
(ENU)
,
whose general purpose would be to replace the current
'scientific-humanist' curriculum with a 'polytechnic and
general" one." b7 Recognizing that Church-related schools
would be adversely affected, the hierarchy vigorously rejected
this proposal. Their opposition played a major role in Al-
lende's decision not to proceed with the education reform
measure
.
6 8
As we have previously indicated, though the Church
hierarchy has refrained from making political committments
and from disapproving of certain forms of governments, the
Church can nevertheless live under a variety of regimes.
However, when it comes to the matter of Church survival,
there has traditionally been very little room to compromise.
This is aptly illustrated in the Church's reponse to the
Pinochet regime.
Catholic spokesmen initially said, "The Church is not
called on to form governments or to overthrow them, to recog-
nize them or not to recognize them. We accept the government
which these people have chosen to give themselves and we
serve it." 68 However, as the Junta stepped up its repressive
67 Lester Sobel, p. 124.
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acts, especially its arrests, expulsions, and even killings
of Catholic priests, the Church became alarmed.
At first, the Church hierarchy, under the leadership
of Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez, publicly made excuses for
the Junta and overlooked many of its abuses. But criticism
fast emerged from the lower ranks of the clergy. A committee
sponsored by Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religious
leaders reportedly prepared a document charging the Junta with
brutal acts of torture. The Church review, "Mensaje, founded
by Jesuits, asserted that 'force' would not enable Chileans
to build a fatherland' where 'justice and brotherhood exist
not only in speeches but in actions.'" 70 By eight months
after the coup, the Roman Catholic hierarchy was sharply
criticising the Pinochet regime. The Catholic Church publicly
declared its opposition to the economic policies of the Pino-
chet regime and the pervasive political repression and vio-
lence. The Junta was turning equally hostile toward the
Church. An Air Force commander
,
exemplifying the regime's
disdain for the Church, commented, "I have great respect for
the Church, but like many men, without realizing it, they are
vehicles for Marxism." 72 The ultimate irony in this statement
may very well be the fact that in repressing this slowly
70 Lester Sobel, pp, 169-170,
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evolving leftist tendency among the Chilean masses, the
Pinochet regime itself may be unwittingly leading Chile to
more radical, leftist social change.
Five Faces of the Church
The Roman Catholic Church in Chile has been examined
up to this point from an historical perspective. The remain-
der of this case study will discuss the clerical institution
from different vantage points: the Church-State approach,
Papal-Church relations, hierarchical structure, new trends
in Chile and Church response.
Church—State relations in Chile can best be understood
if we consider their association before and after the reform
measures enacted by the government in the late 1800's. Prior
to these acts, an antagonistic relationship existed between
Church and State. The tension between the two was appropriate,
as far as the Church was concerned, since the state was trying
to retrieve the secular powers and influence which the Church
had deemed necessary to maintain its position in society.
Following this period, Church-State relations for the most
part, eased substantially. In fact, severe conflict has only
erupted since that time with the military coup of 1973.
In light of this historical division, we can also
discuss the political tendencies of the Church in these two
periods. For most of the 19th century, the Church behaved
as a conservative instituion, acting in direct opposition to
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the progressively liberal regimes. During the 20th century,
the Chilean Church has become so reform-oriented (particularly
m view of its earlier stature) that it has been duly stamped
the most progressive Church in Latin America.
The influence of the Papacy has played a significant
role in the history of the Chilean Church, It is certainly
no coincidence that at approximately the same time that Pope
Leo XIII delivered his Rerum Novarum, the Chilean hierarchy
began to change its attitude concerning the role of the Church
in society. Since that time, the progressive tendency of the
Chilean Church has been given momentum by various Papal ac-
tions. A prime example of such support can be identified after
the separation of 1925 when the powers in Rome intervened in
the controversy on the side of the progressive clergy, con-
firming the necessity for Church political neutrality. Again,
the tendencies of the progressive Chilean clergy were confirmed
by Pope Paul's message at the Medellin Conference in 1968. The
Chilean hierarchy has not been slow to follow the lead of
Papal directives, as have other Latin American Churches.
The apparent unanimity among Chilean clergy presents
us with the image of a monolithic Church. In fact, in the
case of Chile, it is difficult to consider the Church hier-
archy as a fragmented body. To be sure, "the relatively small
number of bishops and their frequent meetings to deal with
common problems have given the Chilean episcopate a unified
and progressive character and image that distinguised it from
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clerical hierarchies in other Latin American countries. As
a small group the bishops have achieved a high degree of
friendship and homogeneity that has had an effect on the
positions taken by the episcopate." 73 However, if we look
back in history, there have been eruptions of discontent
within the hierarchy, particularly around the periods of
political transitions and upheaval. We are referring here
to the clerical dissension exhibited shortly after the dis—
association of Church and State and the disaffection with
Christian Democracy by the more radical clergy in the late
1960 s and early 1970's. David Mutchler points to widespread
organizational conflict within the Chilean hierarchy and par-
ticularly to dissension within the ranks toward the end of
the Christian Democratic regime.
Unlike the Colombian Church, the Catholic Church has
not had a firm religious grasp on the people. The tendency
for religious tolerat ion
,
going back to the mid-1800's, is
testimony to this fact. So with the introduction of various
movements and philosophies in Chile, the Church has been
especially fearful of encroachments on its "territory."
Particularly in view of the fact that today, Chile has a
greater percentage of Protestants than in any other Latin
American country, the fear of a Protestant threat is certainly
7
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valid. 74 The liberal political climate in Chile has also
been a cause for concern among Chilean clerics. This was
certainly apparent in 1958, when after Allende lost the pre-
sidency by a small margin, clerics actively supported Chris-
tian Democracy in the 1964 election. The hierarchy has since
recognized that their support of anti-leftist policies is
counter-productive in the attempt to maintain the loyalties
of their following.
The Church has aggressively responded to these devel-
opments. It has reacted to Protestantism by creating various
grass-roots organizations. These actions are particuarly
significant in Chile because they represent efforts emanating
from all levels of the hierarchy. The Church has attempted
to counter the success of radical political parties by unof-
ficially backing another political party, the Christian Demo-
crats. The net effect of this action was, 1) to remove itself
from direct contact with the political sphere, and 2) to
release its energies so as to concentrate on social programs.
Adaptation
The five "faces" of the Roman Catholic Church in Chile
each explain or illustrate different aspects of this particular
clerical institution. However, a broader overview serves not
7 4 Lloyd Mecham, p. 222.
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only to take into account these perspectives, but allows the
observer to get a full view of the Church as well. The theory
of adaptation, which was presented in the introductory chap-
ter, has this effect of clarifying our perceptions of the
Church and then of coordinating them into a unified framework.
This theme is particularly interesting because of a
handicap peculiar to the Chilean Church. It is one of the
poorer Churches in Latin America in terms of material wealth.
Secondly, the Church does not have strong anchorages in the
Chilean masses. The fact that the Church has been able to
endure, to exhibit considerable influence and to establish
progressive, well-organized social programs, sheds some light
on its ability to adapt.
Essentially, because the Church has not been able to
rely on its wealth nor on the people's religious loyalties,
it has had to demonstrate a remarkable degree of flexibility
to persist in Chilean society. 75 This tendency of the Church
was aptly illustrated during the transition period prior to
and including the separation of Church and State in 1925.
The hierarchy had fought throughout the 1800's, opposing any
measures leading to an eventual disassociation between Church
and State. When this adamant viewpoint was no longer tenable
due to massive dissatisfaction with the traditional role of
the clerical hierarchy in society, the chameleon-like nature
7 Frederick Turner, p. 206.
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of the Church in the political and social spheres emerged.
The once inflexible position of the Church with regard to its
disestablishment from the State was readily altered to accord
with the wishes of the Chilean masses. This sensitivity is
a direct result of the particular "handicaps" of the Chilean
Church.
The Church is not only interested in the means to
survival, but also how best its interests can be served. in
this light, Church reliance on Christian Democracy as a "buf-
fer" between its policies and direct political involvement
was skillful. There became no need prior to the 1964 election
to oppose leftist parties in a direct political confrontation.
Christian Democratic leaders served this purpose well. In
addition, the Church was able to meet its social/pastoral
needs and attempt to reach the marginal masses by devoting
more time to social programs.
The fact that the Church could support a socialistic
regime like Allende's (which it had been preaching against in
the 1964 elections) could be interpreted by some as a hypo-
critical act. These people would find further evidence for
this hypothesis in the Church's initially favorable response
to the military junta, which overthrew Allende. Perhaps a
more consistent view would not pronounce moral dictums on the
Church, but rather see the Church in its historical role of
adapting to the prevailing views of the Chilean people. For
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instance, the former hypothesis cannot easily justify the
Church's present opposition to the Pinochet regime.
The theme of adaptation presents a more cohesive,
consistent approach to explaining why the Church is refusing
to legitimate the political activities of the Pinochet re-
gime. In light of the killing of clergy, the takeover of
Catholic universities and schools and the overall political
repression of the Chilean people, it is reasonable that the
Church has emerged in opposition to the present government.
The Chilean Church today is one of the only institutions with
the moral authority and the mass support to publicly oppose
the Pinochet regime.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters, an hypothesis has been pre-
sented concerning the political posture of the Roman Catholic
Church m Latin America. We have suggested a different way
of looking at the religious institution, a perspective which
encompasses the five approaches discussed in the introductory
section. The theme of adaptation refers to the ability of
the Catholic Church to accommodate to a variety of political
and social conditions in order to persist as a religious
institution. We noted earlier that the Church in Latin Amer-
ica has had to confront varied, often disconcerting situations,
like State anti-clerical policies, progressive Papal direc-
tives, dissension within the clerical ranks, and new trends
and movements in Latin America challenging its status and
authority. To adjust to these pressures, and at the same time,
to maintain its influential position in Latin society, the
Church has exhibited a flexibility and a willingness to com-
promise .
In order to demonstrate that such an hypothesis is
grounded in reality, we have undertaken an examination of
actual case studies: The Church in Colombia and Chile. Since
the theme of adaptation does not lend itself to short-term
study, we have viewed the Church in both countries over a
long period of time. For that reason, we chose an historial
overview as a means to understanding the theme of adaptation.
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We found that the experiences of the Colombian and
Chilean Churches were quite similar in the early to mid-19th
century. The Church in these two countries grew out of simi-
lar beginnings. Spain, throughout Latin America, planted the
seeds of Catholicism and nurtured a religious zeal in the peo-
ple. In these early years of statehood, the Church could be
identified as a highly politicized institution, embroiled in
the political maneuverings of the parties and the governments
in power. The Church often found itself to be the very root
of political division within Colombia and Chile. In both
countries, the Liberal Parties supported policies to diminish
the Church's privileged position in society. Likewise, in
both countries, the Church aligned with the Conservative
Parties which promoted Church perquisites.
In an attempt to determine the value of "adaptation,"
we have purposely chosen Colombia and Chile. These countries
represent extreme cases of Church adaptability to Latin soci-
ety. They exemplify two Churches which have persisted in the
face of extreme political and social conditions. It is pos-
tulated that they have endured, using similar methods of
adaptation.
Adaptation is most visible when the situations are
the most extreme. For this reason, we have not only chosen
two countries which demonstrate extreme cases, but we have
applied this theme to extreme situations within each country.
We have concentrated on those points in Colombian and Chilean
106
history in which the most dramatic political stress and change
have occurred. As we have indicated before, if we cannot see
adaptation work in these cases, it will be near impossible
to view it in more moderate ones.
From the late 19th century to the present, the Churches
in Colombia and Chile have evolved into very different reli-
gious institutions, for various social, political and economic
reasons. The key issue which not only demonstrates the Chilean
Church's adaptive nature, but which has since marked the
sharpest distinction between the Colombian and Chilean Churches,
is the legal separation of Church and State in Chile. After
the disestablishment of the Church, the religious issue became
diffused in Chile. Religion no longer marked the battle lines
bewteen political parties. The Church has successfully, since
that time, progressed in its social and religious endeavors.
The Colombian Church has been hampered by its continued poli-
tical involvement. (To be sure, consistent with the theme of
adaptation, the negative aspects of direct political involve-
ment of the Church are more than offset by the overall strength
of the Church in Colombia.) The role of the Catholic Church
has never been extinguished as a controversial issue in the
political sphere and Colombian elites continue to be divided
by religious ideology.
The disestablishment of the Church is an example of
a long-range adaptive process of the Church to the particular
Latin American society. But as previously mentioned, adaptation
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is more pronounced in times of extreme political stress.
The Rojas Pinilla regime in Colombia and the Pinochet regime
in Chile provide appropriate examples. Each has demonstrated
a lack of respect for the Church and a disdain for the reli-
gious institution as a legitimator of governmental policies
and actions. It is interesting to note that the Churches,
though dissimilar in many respects in this period, responded
in precisely the same way. Each Church publicly withdrew
its support and exercised its moral authority in a call for
opposition against the governing powers.
Another example of Church adaptability, though it is
not as blatant, is the role of a "buffer" between the Church
and politics. The buffer serves at least a two-fold purpose.
First, by utilizing the good offices of Christian Democracy
or the National Front, the Church could actively oppose Liberal
trends without compromising its ability to legitimate govern-
ments. Secondly, at the same time, it allowed those Catholics
with Liberal tendencies to avoid direct conflict with the
Church on political issues. Christian Democracy in Chile
and the National Front in Colombia have served this purpose,
though the Christian Democratic Party was more effective. The
Church responded to the development of these two political
forces by withdrawing somewhat from direct political activity
and expending more energy on its social and religious programs.
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The threat of Protestantism in both countries has
elicited somewaht similar adaptive responses. To offset Pro-
testant inroads, both Churches came to realize that Protes-
tantism had to be fought at the grass-roots level. The
Catholic Church has since initiated a program of bringing
laymen into its organizational structure and in developing
social policies focusing on the problems of the masses.
A simplistic view of the relative position of the
Church in Chile and Colombia would be that the former is more
advanced than the latter. However, this implies only one
limb of the evolutionary tree. Such a linear progression
overlooks the differing forces acting upon Colombia and Chile
as well as the peculiarities of their internal historical
developments. Before we can draw any conclusions about the
future evolutionary paths of the Colombian and Chilean Churches,
a number of points must be understood about their past and pre-
sent developments. In view of the theme of adaptation, any
projection into the future requires an understanding of why
the Church can adapt; that is to say, in what ways the Church
is unique as a political institution.
The uniqueness of the Church stems from its ability to
persist, while other institutions such as political parties
and movements, find it very difficult to endure alongside a
variety of political structures. More precisely, the Church's
ability to adapt to varied political conditions is rooted in
the particular role it plays in society. The Catholic Church
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is an institution based on religion. Its touchstone is out-
side of politics. This distinction is what sets the Church
apart from other significant political institutions. Ironi-
cally, its base in religion provides it with the tools to
survive in a highly politicized world.
At this point, we can make a distinction with regard
the facets of the Church which enable it to interact and
adjust to the political environment. The religious dogmas
of the Church give the religious institution its purpose and
its meaning. Because they are strict they provide the Church
with an identity. The fact that the Church has rooted its
identity in religious dogmas allows it to be more flexible
in other ways. Religious doctrines provide the Church with
the ability to interpret religious principles in everyday
situations. It is in the religious doctrines that the Cath-
olic Church has found room for adaptation, compromise and
flexibility.
This is in marked contrast to the nature of political
parties and movements. In adapting their political posture,
their political ideology and their very identity become lost.
Rather than adapting to the political process, they become
consumed by it.
The Catholic Church is based in religion. The ulti-
mate threat to the Church is a confrontation or attack on its
very identity. The ideologically and religiously based move-
ments in Latin America present such a threat to the Church.
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The religious institution's massive reaction to various regimes
and movements is, therefore, extreme, not just because the
Church is politically threatened, but because characteristics
within the opposing force are challenging the identity of the
Catholic Church. The belief of the masses in the Church's
religious dogmas becomes that much more significant. As long
as the masses remain loyal to the ideals of the Catholic Church,
its religious stature and moral authority will continue to ad-
vance its political influence.
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